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Abstract
Hovhannisyan, Nune (Ph.D., Economics)
Three Essays on International Technology Transfer
Thesis directed by Professor Wolfgang Keller
The transfer of technology is central to modern economic discourse because of its im-
plications for economic growth and long-run convergence of incomes. In this dissertation, I
investigate questions on channels and modes of technology transfer, analyzing cross-border
ows of goods, ideas and people.
In the rst chapter, I examine the signicance of technological distance for the mode of
international knowledge transfer within multinational corporations. The technology transfer
within multinationals can happen directly, when the a¢ liate licenses the technology from
the parent, or indirectly, when the a¢ liate imports intermediate goods with embodied tech-
nology. This paper estimates the e¤ect of the a¢ liatesproductivity relative to the frontier
the technology gap on the choice to license the technology or import it through interme-
diate goods. The main nding is that a large technology gap of an a¢ liate favors indirect
knowledge transfer through imports.
In the second chapter, we examine (with Wolfgang Keller) the importance of cross-border
labor ows for innovation. Face-to-face communication may be particularly important for
the transfer of technology because technology is best explained and demonstrated in person.
This paper studies the role of short-term cross-border labor movements for innovation by
estimating the recent impact of U.S. business travel to foreign countries on their patenting
rates. The results indicate that business travel has a signicant e¤ect on patenting rates
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above and beyond technology transfer through the channels of international trade and foreign
direct investment. This study provides initial evidence that international air travel may be
an important channel through which cross-country income di¤erences can be reduced.
In the nal chapter I analyze whether short-term labor movements matter for technology
sourcing from abroad. As knowledge creation is concentrated in several countries, it is espe-
cially important for developing countries to tap into foreign knowledge. This paper focuses
on a novel channel of technology sourcing: international business travel. Business travel-
ers coming to a high-technology country can learn about technological knowledge through
face-to-face communication and bring it back to their home country. This paper nds that
business travel to the U.S. from foreign countries increases their domestic innovation.
iv
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1 "Technology Gap and International Knowledge Transfer: New
Evidence from the Operations of Multinational Corporations"
1.1 Introduction
There has been a signicant increase in the levels of global trade in goods and services.
Two components of this increase are noteworthy: currently, global trade in ideas is reaching
annual levels of $200 billion (World Development Indicators),1 and trade in intermediate
inputs comprises 57% of total trade in goods in OECD countries (Miroudot, Lanz and
Ragoussis 2009).
The United States is a major seller of technology, accounting for around 50% of world
royalties and license fee receipts (World Development Indicators), and trade in intermedi-
ate inputs in the U.S. accounts for half of total trade in goods (Miroudot et al. 2009).
U.S. Multinational Corporations (MNC) are important conduits of technology transfer, with
around two-thirds of royalties and license receipts coming from intra-rm transactions and
approximately 60% of total trade within U.S. multinationals being trade in intermediate
inputs (The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis).
A MNC can transfer its technology to foreign a¢ liates in disembodied form (know-how,
industrial processes, computer software) or in embodied form (intermediate inputs). Flows
of royalty and license receipts from a¢ liates to parents for the use of intangible technology
is evidence of disembodied technology transfer, while exports of goods for further processing
from parents to a¢ liates can indicate embodied technology transfer. It is well known that
1Trade in disembodied ideas is measured by world receipts (or payments) of royalties and license fees.
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technology transfer is an important determinant of long-term cross-country income, economic
growth and convergence of countries. However, the mode of technology transfer in embodied
versus disembodied form has a di¤erential impact not only on access to current knowledge
and economic growth, but also on innovation, economic welfare, and convergence. The
history of the soft drink "Fanta", which was invented by the German a¢ liate of the Coca-
Cola Company, o¤ers one example. Possessing the recipe for Coca-Cola but lacking all the
required ingredients due to a shortage in World War II-era Germany, Coca-Cola Deutschland
invented this new soft drink by using the only available ingredients instead. In addition,
the mode of technology transfer might also a¤ect the degree of knowledge spillovers from
multinational a¢ liates to domestic rms, which improves the productivity of the latter.2
What determines the mode of technology transfer within a MNC? This paper provides
new evidence that the technology gap of U.S. MNC foreign a¢ liates, dened as their produc-
tivity compared to the productivity frontier, is associated with the decision of U.S. multina-
tionals to export tangible goods versus intangible technology within the MNC. The example
of Intel Corporation illustrates the hypothesis behind this paper. For 25 years, Intel Corpo-
ration has had plants in China where chips (intermediate goods) are shipped for assembly
and testing. But in October 2010, the company announced the opening of a new wafer fab-
rication facility (fab) in China capable of using the blueprint to make the actual chips. At
the same time, Intel announced the opening of a chip assembly factory in Vietnam (Taka-
hashi 2010a; 2010b). One of the reasons why Chinese a¢ liates of Intel Corporation currently
receive technology in the form of blueprints while Vietnamese a¢ liates receive technology
2See Keller (2010) for a survey of evidence on technology spillovers from international trade and foreign
direct investment.
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in the for of intermediate goods is that the former are currently closer to the productivity
frontier, while the latter are farther from the frontier.
A panel data on the activities of U.S. multinationals in 47 host countries and across 7
manufacturing industries is employed to analyze the relationship between the a¢ liates tech-
nology gap and the share of importing technology versus inputs. Focusing on the activities
of U.S. MNCs is attractive as there is information on both the technology and input ows
within rms. These data come from legally mandated benchmark surveys, conducted every
ve years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which enable the identication of
U.S. parent-a¢ liate tangible and intangible technology transfers across FDI host countries
and industries. The technology gap is measured as the deviation of the a¢ liates labor pro-
ductivity from the parent productivity in the same industry and year. The main nding of
this paper is that the technology gap is negatively related to the share of disembodied versus
embodied technology transfer, with a 10 percent increase in the technology gap on average
decreasing the share of licensing versus importing inputs by 5 percent.
The signicance of this paper stems from the realization that, based on industry patterns,
MNCs tend to share know-how with country a¢ liates that are more productive, but export
intermediate goods to the less productive ones. The fact that a¢ liates which are far from the
frontier receive technology in the form of goods and not disembodied ideas, leads to policy
implications that for developing less-productive countries the reduction in the technology
gap would involve direct access to knowledge and ideas. This not only gives such countries
access to current information, but also stimulates the creation of new knowledge which in
itself is important for long-run economic growth and convergence.
The theory on multinational enterprises identies horizontal and vertical directions for
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Horizontal FDI arises when multinationals replicate their
production in host countries to gain market access (Markusen 1984), whereas vertical FDI
arises when di¤erent stages of production are fragmented to take advantage of di¤erences in
factor prices (Helpman 1984), intra-industry considerations (Alfaro and Charlton 2009), or
international transaction costs (Keller and Yeaple 2012).3 Country empirical studies have
found that market sizes, country similarity, factor endowments, and barriers to trade are
among the most important determinants of FDI, while country-industry studies nd that
these factors have a di¤erential impact on FDI in various industries.4
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on vertical production sharing
within multinationals, where part of production takes place locally in a¢ liates while the
other is imported from parents (Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 2005; Fouquin, Nayman
and Wagner 2007; Keller and Yeaple 2012). Hanson and coauthors nd that MNC for-
eign a¢ liates demand for imported inputs is higher in a¢ liate countries with lower trade
costs, lower wages for less-skilled labor, and lower corporate income tax rates (Hanson, Mat-
aloni and Slaughter 2005). Keller and Yeaple (2012) formalize and empirically conrm that
knowledge intensity is another important determinant for the location of intermediate input
production, where it is more di¢ cult to transfer technology in more knowledge-intensive in-
dustries.5 This paper di¤ers from the work of Hanson and colleagues and Keller and Yeaple
by employing a direct measure which di¤erentiates between transfer of tangible intermediate
inputs versus intangible technology from U.S. parents to a¢ liates.
3Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) formalize "export-platform" FDI with both horizontal and vertical
motivations.
4See Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Bergstrand and Egger (2007), Brainard (1997) for country
studies, and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Awokuse, Maskus and An (2012) for country-industry
studies.
5Keller and Yeaple (2008) provide key theoretical microeconomic foundations.
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A second body of literature has documented the importance of productivity di¤erences
in subsidiaries of foreign companies for knowledge ows within MNCs.6 Bjorn and coauthors
nd that the larger the technology gap, the more important the foreign parent as a source
of codied knowledge, dened as patents, licenses and R&D (Bjorn, Johannes and Ingmar
2005). Their study used survey data for foreign rms in Eastern European countries, but did
not include knowledge embodied in intermediate goods.7 A related study by Dri¢ eld, Love
and Menghinello (2010), nds that Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of foreign a¢ liates
in Italy is important for technology transfer from a¢ liates to parents (sourcing), but not
important for technology transfer from parents to a¢ liates (exploiting).8 Using data on
French multinationals, Fouquin, Nayman and Wagner (2007) nd that labor productivity
of countries is positively associated with imported-input demand for a¢ liates in developed
countries, but is negatively related for a¢ liates in developing countries.
This paper adds to the rst body of literature a relative measure of embodied and disem-
bodied technology to empirical analysis of multinationalsvertical production networks. In
relation to the second body of literature, this paper explicitly identies two forms of knowl-
edge transfer within MNCs and highlights within-rm productivity di¤erences of a¢ liates as
an important factor in determining the mode of technology transfer. As the decision of trans-
fer occurs within the rm, a¢ liate productivity may be endogenously determined by MNCs.
This is addressed in the present study relying on a theory of trade, FDI, and technology
6Martin and Salomon (2003) discuss general knowledge transfer capacities in multinational corporations.
7See also Gupta and Govindarajan (2000). Using country-level analysis, they nd that knowledge ows
within multinationals from home to host country are higher the lower the relative level of economic devel-
opment of the host country (measured by GDP per capita).
8The survey used in Dri¢ eld et al. (2010) is based on a binary response to whether there was transfer of
scientic and technological knowledge from parent to a¢ liate, which does not distinguish between tangible
(intermediate goods) and intangible (patents, licenses, software) forms.
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transfer (Keller and Yeaple 2012). Furthermore, across country and across year variation in
labor productivity of a¢ liates of U.S. MNCs within the same manufacturing industry is used
to identify not only the direction of the impact, but also parameter estimates. A limitation
of this paper is the usage of aggregated country-industry level data due to inaccessibility of
condential rm-level data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the
theoretical foundation. Section 3 presents the empirical estimation strategy and discusses
estimation issues. Section 4 details data sources, variable construction, and descriptive
statistics. The results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Foundation
The objective of this paper is to estimate whether there is a connection between the tech-
nological gap of MNC a¢ liates and the mode of international knowledge transfer from the
multinational parents to a¢ liates across countries and industries. This paper focuses on one
parent countrys (the United States) a¢ liates abroad as it imposes certain homogeneity in
terms of a¢ liate activities. Assume that U.S. multinationals decided where to locate their
foreign a¢ liates.9 The remaining decision involves the type of knowledge transfer, which is
measured by the transfer of technology (know-how, industrial processes) versus intermedi-
ate goods from the U.S. parents to host country a¢ liates.10 Direct measures of technology
licensing payments and imports of goods for further processing are used to specically pin
9Since the analysis in this paper is based on industry data, it prevents the study of questions related to
the rm-level location decisions of the U.S. MNC a¢ liates abroad.
10This paper does not include arms length technology transfer of U.S. multinational corporations to other
una¢ liated domestic or foreign entities. Within-rm technology transfer in the form of intermediate inputs
and ideas from U.S. parents to a¢ liates is the main focus of this paper. Other types of embodied technology
might include capital goods and people, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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down the share of disembodied versus embodied technology transfer from the U.S. parents
to a¢ liates. The technology gap of an a¢ liate is measured by the deviation of its labor
productivity from the parents labor productivity in the same industry and year.
The approach for estimating the relationship between the technology gap and interna-
tional knowledge transfer is as follows. I specify that the share of technology transfer (in
intangible and tangible forms) to an a¢ liate country c in industry i, TTci is a function 
of the technology gap of an a¢ liate country c in industry i; TGci and of other observed and
unobserved determinants, Zci:
TTci = (TGci; Zci;); (1)
where  is a vector of unknown parameters. The equation (1) can serve as a reduced-form
of a model of technology transfer within multinational corporations. The theoretical model
that motivates the empirical analysis that follows is based on Keller and Yeaple (2012). This
model of trade, FDI, and international technology transfer builds on the transaction costs
of international activities. There exist shipping costs to transfer intermediates that embody
technological information from the U.S. parents to a¢ liates and communication costs to
transfer disembodied technology. Shipping costs of moving goods across borders increase with
distance from the parent, while communication costs of transferring disembodied technology
are higher in more knowledge-intensive industries than in less knowledge-intensive industries.
According to this theory, it is harder to transfer technology in more knowledge-intensive
industries because technology is tacit and hard to codify, which means it is best conveyed
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face-to-face.11 In the absence of in-person communication, the technology transfer may be
more imperfect the more knowledge-intensive the industry is. Multinational rms face a
tradeo¤ between trade costs and technology transfer costs, which explains why there is a
gravity of multinational sales, where a¢ liate sales fall with distance from the home country.
Since a¢ liate sales are positively related to productivity, this theory serves as a con-
ceptual framework to explain what drives productivity di¤erences across a¢ liate countries
and industries. Trade costs and technology transfer costs increase with distance to the U.S.,
which is reected in the lower productivity of a¢ liates. Furthermore, for a given distance
from the U.S., a more knowledge-intensive industry, on average, receives lower a¢ liate sales
(lower productivity). The theoretical framework suggests taking into account trade costs
and technology transfer costs in driving productivity di¤erences across host countries and
industries. The following section discusses the empirical methodology.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
Based on the theoretical framework described above, the following estimation equation is
employed:
Lic_imp_sharecit =  + TechGapcit + X1cit + X2ct+ c + t + "cit; (2)
where c indexes a¢ liate countries, i indexes industries, t indexes time. Licensing-import
share is dened as
11For a discussion of the importance of face-to-face communication for transfering technology, see for
example Koskinen and Vanharanta (2002) and Hovhannisyan and Keller (2011).
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Lic_import_sharecit =
Royalty_license_ receiptscit
Royalty_licence_receiptscit + Exports_goods_manufcit
; (3)
where royalties and license receipts of the U.S. parents from the a¢ liates is a measure
of payments for the usage of disembodied technology, and U.S. exports of goods for further
manufacture from U.S. parents to a¢ liates is a measure of embodied technology in the form
of intermediate goods.
Technology gap is dened as
TechGapcit =
ParentLabprodit   Labprodcit
ParentLabprodit
(4)
where ParentLabprodit is parent labor productivity in an industry and year, and Labprodcit
is a¢ liate labor productivity in a country, industry and year.
Based on theory described above (Keller and Yeaple 2012), the productivity of a¢ liates
falls with distance from the United States due to increasing trade costs and technology
transfer costs. Furthermore, technology transfer in more knowledge-intensive industries is
more costly than in less knowledge-intensive industries. Thus, the labor productivity of
a¢ liates is weighted by the relative distance of the a¢ liate country from the U.S., as well as
the relative knowledge-intensity of the industry. The weighted labor productivity Labprodcit
is constructed as
Labprodcit =
1
Distc KIit 
gLabprodcit (5)
where Distc is geographical distance between the U.S. and the a¢ liate country, KIit is
9
knowledge-intensity of an industry measured by parent R&D expenditures over sales (fol-
lowing Keller and Yeaple 2012), and gLabprodcit is unweighted labor productivity of a¢ liates.
Turning to remaining variables of equation (2), X1 is a vector of control variables at the
country-industry-year such as trade costs, X2 is a vector of control variables at the country-
year level such as population, GDP per capita, and human and physical capital per worker,
c are country xed e¤ects, and t are time xed e¤ects. It is expected that the coe¢ cient on
 will be negative, implying that the smaller the technology gap of an a¢ liates is (closer to
frontier productivity), the more the a¢ liate will import technology directly (paying royalties
and license fees) relative to importing goods for further processing.12
It is important to mention that licensing-import share is bounded between 0 and 1 with
clusters of values at extreme points. We can employ a two-part Tobit model which is a
widely used estimation method for censored data. Greene (2004) shows that maximum like-
lihood estimates of Tobit with xed e¤ects exhibit almost no bias, and incidental parameter
problems do not need special adjustment. An alternative to Tobit is fractional logit model,
suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996; 2008), where conditional mean is modeled as a
logistic function. Before turning to the empirical analysis and results, the next section gives
an overview of the data and descriptive statistics of the main variables.
12In the robustness analysis, other measures of frontier will be employed as well.
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1.4 Data
1.4.1 Main Variables
The primary data used in this paper are based on operations of U.S. MNCs abroad and
come from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data cover 47 coun-
tries where U.S. multinationals have a¢ liates, span 7 NAICS manufacturing industries, and
include 2 benchmark survey years (1999 and 2004). The manufacturing industries used
in the analysis are food, chemicals, primary and fabricated metals, machinery, computers
and electronic products, electrical equipment, appliances and components, and transporta-
tion equipment. The list of a¢ liate countries used in the analysis is given in Appendix 1.
The analysis is restricted to the benchmark survey years because part of the data is avail-
able only in these surveys.13 Additionally, industry classication has changed from SIC to
NAICS, which prevents using earlier benchmark years.14
Licensing-Import Share is constructed using data on royalties and license fees received
by U.S. parents and on U.S. exports of goods shipped to majority-owned a¢ liates for further
processing. Royalties and license receipts, net of withholding taxes, received by U.S. parents
from its a¢ liates comes from the balance of payments and direct investment position data
in 1999 and 2004.15,16 Data on royalties and license receipts o¤er an appropriate measure of
13U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture, processing and assembly is only collected in benchmark
survey years.
14The other benchmark survey years are 1989 and 1994. The publicly available data from BEA by country-
industry are based on broadly dened industries. Due to a change in classication from SIC to NAICS,
the Computers and Electronic Products manufacturing category was added, which would not allow direct
comparison across industries with earlier benchmark years.
15A more precise measure would be royalties and license receipts by U.S. parents from its majority-
owned foreign a¢ liates or payments to U.S. parents by its majority-owned foreign a¢ liates. Unfortunately,
benchmark surveys of 1999 and 2004 do not provide that type of detailed data broken down by country-
industry. Overall, around 90% of royalties and license fee receipts by U.S. parents from foreign a¢ liates are
from majority-owned foreign a¢ liates.
16Using data on royalties and license fees which are net of withholding taxes, tax policy di¤erences across
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direct technology as these receipts are for the use or sale of intangible property or rights such
as patents, industrial processes, trademarks, copyrights, franchises, manufacturing rights,
and other intangible assets or proprietary rights (U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Final
Results from the 1999 Benchmark Survey, 2004).17 Overall, approximately 50% of royalties
and license fee payments from foreign a¢ liates to U.S. parents are for industrial processes
which are most closely related to the payments for the usage of disembodied technology.18
Royalty and license receipts reect the value of technology transfer, which could reect
changes in the volume of technology or changes in price. There are widely known di¢ culties
with pricing and units of output of intangibles (Robbins 2009). Robbins notes that royalty
payments for licensing of industrial processes often consist of a lump-sum payment and a
royalty as a percentage of receipts.19 In terms of price, transfer pricing is such that under
U.S. law multinationals are required to charge the same price for intra-rm transactions on
intangible assets as for unrelated arms length transactions (Feenstra et al. 2010). Another
di¢ culty with royalty and license receipts lies in the value of technology transfer that rms
report, particularly coming from di¤erent countries. Branstetter and coauthors argue that
under U.S. tax codes and the laws of foreign countries, there are restrictions on how U.S.
multinationals make and value royalty payments. Furthermore, U.S. multinationals charge
the same royalties for a¢ liates in di¤erent countries in order to avoid scrutiny from tax
a¢ liate countries should be mitigated.
17See Howestine (2008) who describes various innovation-related data in the BEA international economic
surveys.
18Data on royalties and license fees broken down by the type of intangible asset between a¢ liated parties
is available starting from 2006. On average in the period 2006-2009, U.S. parentsreceipts of royalties and
license fees from a¢ liates included 50% of receipts for industrial processes, 30% for general use computer
software, 15% for trademarks, and 5% for franchise fees, with the remainder to other categories.
19Vishwasrao (2007) explores the factors determining the type of payments (up-front fees, royalties, or a
combination of both) for the technology transfer based on rm and industry characteristics for subsidiaries
as well as for una¢ liated rms.
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authorities (Branstetter et al. 2006).
Data on the U.S. exports of goods comes from 1999 and 2004 benchmark surveys and
is measured by the United States (either from the U.S. parent or another party) exports
of goods shipped to majority-owned a¢ liates for further processing, assembly, or manufac-
ture.20,21 In 2004, exports for further processing from the U.S. parents to foreign a¢ liates
were 60% of total exports and 90% within the manufacturing industry (BEA).
Technology gap is constructed using data on the gross product and number of employ-
ees of U.S. MNC parents and majority-owned foreign a¢ liates from the BEA. First, labor
productivity of MNC parents is calculated as gross product (value added) divided by the
number of employees for a given industry and year. It is taken as the frontier for a given
industry and year. Then, labor productivity of majority-owned foreign a¢ liates is calculated
as gross product (value added) divided by the number of employees for a given country, in-
dustry and year.22 Finally, labor productivity of a¢ liates is weighted according to equation
(3), where distance data is obtained from CEPII and R&D data from the BEA. The tech-
nology gap of a given a¢ liate is constructed as a relative di¤erence from the frontier labor
productivity (see equation 4). In this form, di¤erences in productivity across industries are
controlled for, and the identication of technology gap comes from variation across a¢ liate
countries and years in a given manufacturing industry.
20Although the U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture includes goods shipped from the U.S. parents
or other U.S. entities, overall around 85% of imports by a¢ liates from the United States is from the U.S.
parents.
21Because of non-disclosure and condentiality, the BEA does not provide small portion of data for royalties
and license fees and for U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture broken down by country and industry.
Data given in a range [-$500,000; $500,000] is coded as $500,000; data is lled in with the same number for
observations where country-industry data is available for one year and missing for another (11% for exports,
and 3% for royalties).
22Due to condentiality, a small portion of employment gures is given in ranges; in those cases, the
midpoint of the range is taken.
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1.4.2 Controls
Research & Development expenditures (R&D) are considered an important determinant of
technology transfer. Overall, a¢ liate R&D expenditures in manufacturing comprise around
15-17% of parent R&D expenditures in the period of analysis (U.S. BEA). However, there are
considerable di¤erences of aggregate industry-level a¢ liate R&D expenditures as a fraction
of parent R&D expenditures. For example, in 1999 food industry a¢ liates performed around
40% of expenditures compared to U.S. parents, while in the electronics industry in the same
year the gure was around 5%. Therefore, to control for these di¤erences, R&D ratio of
a¢ liate R&D expenditures to parent R&D expenditures is constructed from U.S. BEA data.
To account for potential endogeneity of R&D expenditures, previous years R&D data is
used for both parents and a¢ liates. It is expected that the more R&D a¢ liates perform,
compared to their U.S. parents in that industry, the larger will be the share of imported
technology versus goods, as in these industries a¢ liatesability to use know-how directly
will be increased. One possible reason is that if an a¢ liate performs R&D itself, it can
understand the technology better as technology tends to be tacit.
Although the empirical analysis controls for country and year xed e¤ects, there may
still be di¤erences across host country a¢ liates over time, and across industries. One of the
most important factors that will impact licensing-import share is trade costs, as it is costly
to transfer goods across borders. Following Hanson and colleagues (2005) and Keller and
Yeaple (2012), ad-valorem trade costs at country-industry-year level are constructed as a
sum of freight costs and tari¤s:
 cit = 1 + freightcit + tariffcit; (6)
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Both freight costs and tari¤ measures at the country-industry-year level are constructed
following the methodology of Hanson and coauthors (2005) and Keller and Yeaple (2012).23,24
Freight costs are calculated as the ratio of import charges over customs value of imports.
Tari¤s are obtained from the TRAINS database using WITS software of the World Bank.25
There are vast di¤erences across a¢ liate countries in the level of development, size, factor
endowments and other economic factors that might drive di¤erences in U.S. FDI. To control
for host countrys development level and size, population and GDP per capita are obtained
from Penn World Tables (PWT 6.3). Intellectual Property Rights Protection (IPR) in a¢ li-
ate countries might also be an important determinant for the transfer of technology from the
U.S. parent to a¢ liate.26 The IPR protection index is obtained from Park (2008). Human
capital per worker is constructed using data from Barro and Lee (2010) Educational Attain-
ment Dataset for average years of schooling for individuals over 25 and employment gures
from Yearbook of Labor Statistics (International Labor Organization). Physical capital per
worker is constructed using perpetual inventory method and data from Penn World Tables
(PWT 6.3) and the International Labor Organization.27
23Using highly disaggregated data on U.S. imports in HS classication from www.internationaldata.org
for 1999 and 2004, freight cost value is calculated as import charges (freight, insurance and other charges)
over customs value of imports. To aggregate these gures to BEA industry classication, freight cost value is
weighted by the relative importance of a given HS code in BEA code based on U.S. exports to that country.
24I am grateful to Wolfgang Keller and Stephen Yeaple for help with trade cost data.
25Weighted tari¤s in 4-digit SIC classication is extracted from WITS software of the World Bank and
matched to BEA classication.
26Branstetter et al. (2006) nd connection between stronger IPR and increased technology transfer within
multinational corporations.
27In addition, there might be location-based di¤erences and interdependencies in knowledge acquisition
across a¢ liate countries (see e.g. Leonardi 2010), which are mitigated by including country xed e¤ects.
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1.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
The nal sample is an unbalanced panel of 47 countries, 7 manufacturing industries, and
2 years (1999 and 2004). Summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table
1.28 On average, exports of goods for further manufacture is around 8 times larger than
royalties and license receipts.29 Both royalties and license fees and exports of goods for
further processing are quite dispersed with a large standard deviation. Licensing-import
share, representing a technological measure of preference between imports of goods versus
technology, is bounded between 0 and 1 by construction, with the smaller values representing
a preference towards importing of intermediates and the larger values preference towards
licensing the technology. Figure 1 presents a histogram of licensing-import share which
shows that around 30% of observations are close to zero, with 15% of values being strictly
zero and 2% of values being 1.30
Table 2 presents industry averages of licensing-import share and technology gap variables.
On average, the highest licensing-import share is observed in the food industry (0.431), and
the lowest in computers (0.102). The technology gap varies on average from 0.516 in food
to 0.937 in computers. Country averages of licensing-import share and technology gap are
presented in Table 3. On average, the lowest licensing-import share is in Brazil (0.043) and
the highest licensing-import share across countries is in Saudi Arabia (0.914). The variation
28In this analysis, I focus on positive numbers of technology gap, as my analysis does not apply to the
case when weighted labor productivity of a¢ liates is larger than parent labor productivity. Since weighted
labor productivity is based on distance, Canada is a large outlier which is dropped from the analysis.
29Feenstra et al. (2010) discuss various reasons for mismeasurement of international trade in ideas. Par-
ticularly, they note that the values of receipts from sales of intangible assets are relatively small because of
possible underreporting of a¢ liates and/or high threshold values for mandatory reports.
30Around 34% of royalties and license fees are zero, and around 24% of U.S. exports of goods for manu-
facture are zero, which by construction results in 15% of zero values in licensing-import share variable.
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in technology gap ranges from 0.5 in Switzerland to 1.050 in Ecuador on average.31
The empirical strategy controls for country and year xed e¤ects, so general di¤erences
across a¢ liate countries and across years are controlled. Additionally, since labor productiv-
ities di¤er across industries, technology gap compares labor productivities within the same
industry-year.
The next section presents the empirical results.
1.5 Results
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate a relationship between the technology gap
of U.S. multinationals foreign a¢ liates and licensing-import share: import of technology
versus import of goods. Table 4 presents initial estimation results of the equation (2) using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). All columns include year xed e¤ects, columns 1 to 5 include
country xed e¤ects, while in column 6 country xed e¤ects are omitted to analyze across
host country a¢ liate di¤erences. Robust standard errors, which allow for clustering by
country-year, are shown in parentheses. Column 1 shows that there is a strong negative
correlation between a¢ liates technology gap and their licensing-import share: within an
industry, foreign a¢ liates with a large technology gap from parents import relatively less
technology in the form of blueprints and designs and more in the form of intermediate
goods.
The addition of trade costs in column 2 decreases the coe¢ cient of technology gap only
slightly from  0:188 to  0:164 while it remains highly signicant at 1 percent. As expected,
31There were industries where Ecuador had negative gross product which resulted in a technology gap
higher than 1.
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trade costs are estimated to be positive and signicant, showing that import of goods is
negatively related to trade barriers, resulting in a larger licensing-import share. In column
3 the ratio of industry-level R&D expenditures of a¢ liates to parents is added. The R&D
ratio results in a positive coe¢ cient, meaning that a¢ liate industries with high R&D relative
to parent R&D are licensing more disembodied technology rather than technology embodied
in intermediate goods. However, the coe¢ cient is not signicant.
Additional country-year level controls are added in column 4. The coe¢ cient on pop-
ulation is negative though not signicant, while GDP per capita has a positive e¤ect on
licensing-import share. In column 5, IPR protection index and endowments of human and
physical capital are added. With the addition of these variables, population becomes sig-
nicant, and IPR protection index is estimated to be positive and signicant. The negative
coe¢ cient on population is somewhat surprising, but may indicate that in countries with
smaller populations there is relatively more disembodied technology transfer. As expected,
IPR protection index is estimated to be positive, implying that countries with strong pro-
tection of intellectual property receive more technology in the form of blueprints relative to
intermediate goods. With the inclusion of all control variables, the coe¢ cient of technology
gap is around  0:15:
What is the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient? The mean of licensing-import share
is 0:25, while the mean of technology gap is 0:78 (see Table 1). Based on the estimated
coe¢ cient, this means that at the mean a 10% increase in the technology gap of a U.S.
MNC a¢ liate, compared to the parent in the same industry, decreases the share of licensing
versus importing inputs embodying the technology by 5%:32 The magnitude of the estimated
32At the mean, the regression is [0:25 =  0:15  0:78], thus a 10% increase in the right hand side is 0:0117,
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coe¢ cient is economically sizeable.
To gauge general across-country di¤erences in technology gap and licensing-import share,
country xed e¤ects are dropped in column 6. The technology gap is still negative and
signicant, although the magnitude of the coe¢ cient decreases from around  0:15 to around
 0:118. It is surprising that GDP per capita becomes negative and signicant, while IPR
protection becomes insignicant. Overall, the results from table 4 indicate that there is a
signicant e¤ect of technology gap on licensing-import share.
Although the OLS results reported in Table 4 provide important benchmark estimates,
additional econometric models are estimated in Table 5. For convenience, column 1 repeats
the OLS regression presented in Table 4 (column 5), while other econometric specications
are presented in columns 2 to 5. Alternative estimation methods to OLS are median and
robust regressions which are presented in columns 2 and 3. Robust regression is using
iteratively reweighted least squares. Looking at column 2, the coe¢ cient of robust regression
is much smaller ( 0:065 compared to  0:150), while it is highly signicant. The coe¢ cients
on controls are similar to OLS results. Median regression has an advantage over OLS in the
presence of outliers. It is performed as a quantile regression which minimizes the sum of
absolute errors. However, quantile regression does not allow clustering of standard errors.
The coe¢ cient on technology gap is negative and signicant, and the magnitude of the
coe¢ cient is somewhat smaller compared to OLS ( 0:108 compared to  0:150). Overall,
the signs of all variables are similar to the OLS results.
As mentioned previously, the dependent variable is a share with values strictly between
0 and 1 and around 15 percent of zeroes. The possible reason for the existence of zeroes is
which lowers the licensing-import share by 0:0117=0:25 = 5%
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that data on both royalties and license receipts and exports of goods for further manufacture
are recorded only when a certain threshold is passed. Therefore, equation 1 is estimated as
a two-way censored Tobit model in column 4. Column 4 shows that technology gap has
a negative and signicant e¤ect on licensing-import share, however the magnitudes of the
estimates are not directly comparable with OLS. Fractional logit estimates, which model
conditional mean as a logistic function, are presented in column 5. The general direction of
coe¢ cient estimates is similar in the latter model, but the magnitudes are di¤erent. On the
whole, in all alternative econometric specications, the technology gap variable is estimated
negative and highly signicant.
Licensing-import share is constructed by combining data on embodied and disembodied
technological transfer. To understand the di¤erences between these two types of technology
transfer, decomposition of the dependent variable is performed in Table 6. For convenience,
column 1 of Table 6 repeats the benchmark estimates of Table 4 (column 5) with licensing-
import share as the dependent variable. In column 2, the dependent variable is intermediate
goods import intensity, constructed as U.S. exports of goods for further manufacture divided
by a¢ liate sales. As expected, the coe¢ cient on technology gap is estimated to be positive
and signicant, implying that a¢ liates with a large technology gap on average import more
intermediate goods. Additionally, the coe¢ cient on trade costs is negative and signicant,
meaning that trade costs decrease intermediate goods import intensity. Turning to column
3, where the dependent variable is disembodied technology transfer intensity (royalty and
license fees divided by a¢ liate sales), as expected the coe¢ cient is negative although not
signicant. The sign of the coe¢ cient implies that a¢ liates with large technology gap receive
relatively less technology in disembodied form. The fact that technology gap in this case is
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not signicantly estimated probably has to do with small values of royalty and license fees.
Overall, the decomposition analysis of licensing-import share conforms to our expectations.
The technology gap of a¢ liates is constructed using parent productivity as the frontier
and is based on weighted labor productivity of a¢ liates (see equations 4 and 3). Table
7 presents results using alternative measures of technology gap. Column 1 repeats the
benchmark estimates of Table 4 (column 5) for convenience. Recall that labor productivity
is weighted by the relative distance of a¢ liate country and relative knowledge intensity of an
industry (see equation 3). In column 2, technology gap is constructed based on unweighted
labor productivity. The coe¢ cient on technology gap is still negative and signicant, however
the magnitude of the coe¢ cient decreases from  0:150 to  0:117. The weighted coe¢ cient
is larger, which shows that it is important to account for di¤erences in proximity of a¢ liates
of U.S. parents to home, as well as the knowledge-intensity of an industry.
Another feasible option for dening technology gap involves using a di¤erent frontier
measure. To test the robustness of using parent productivity as a frontier, we can dene the
frontier as the most productive a¢ liate in the same industry and year, as it is possible that
parents and a¢ liates perform di¤erent tasks. Then, the technology gap of a given a¢ liate is
dened as a relative di¤erence from the most productive a¢ liate in the same industry and
year. It is important to note that in all cases, the frontier a¢ liate comes from a high-income
country a¢ liate. The results of this exercise are reported in column 3 of Table 7. Using
a¢ liate frontier, the coe¢ cient on technology gap is estimated to be negative and signicant
and close to the benchmark ( 0:147 compared to benchmark  0:150). Additionally, the
signs and estimates of the controls are very similar to the benchmark estimates. This shows
that the results are not sensitive to the denition of the frontier.
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As an additional robustness check, technology gap based on productivity per a¢ liate
versus productivity per worker is constructed. Using data on the number of a¢ liates sepa-
rately by country and by industry, the number of a¢ liates by country-industry is calculated.
Productivity per a¢ liate is constructed as gross product divided by the number of a¢ li-
ates. In a similar fashion, productivity per parent is constructed. Then, the technology
gap is calculated as a relative deviation of productivity per a¢ liate from productivity per
parent. The results using productivity per a¢ liate are presented in column 4 of Table 7. The
estimated coe¢ cient on technology gap using productivity per a¢ liate is not signicantly
estimated. However, the sign of the coe¢ cient is still negative. Overall, this table shows
that the main results of this paper are not sensitive to the denition of frontier used in the
construction of technology gap. In all four cases, technology gap is negatively associated
with licensing-import share.
1.6 Conclusions
Multinational corporations are the main mediators of the worldwide increase in technology
trade. Intermediate inputs and know-how are the two forms of technology (tangible and in-
tangible) transferred within multinational corporations that this paper has examined. This
paper analyzed what determines the decision of multinationals on the form of technology
transfer to its a¢ liates, using data on U.S. multinational activity in 47 countries, 7 manu-
facturing industries and 2 years. Detailed data on exports of goods for further processing,
as well as royalties and license payments observed between U.S. MNC parents and their
a¢ liates, enables us to specically identify two types of knowledge transfer from parents to
a¢ liates.
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The main nding of this paper is that the technology gap, measured as the relative labor
productivity di¤erence from the frontier, is negatively related to the share of direct versus
indirect transfer of knowledge from U.S. parents to a¢ liates. Relatively more productive af-
liates get technology in the form of know-how, industrial processes, etc., while relatively less
productive a¢ liates receive technology in the form of intermediate inputs. The magnitude
of the e¤ect is sizeable: a 10 percent increase in the technology gap of a¢ liates decreases
the share of licensing versus importing inputs by 5 percent, on average. These results sug-
gest that productivity of a¢ liates is an important determinant for knowledge transfer within
multinational corporations.
The transfer of technology is central to modern economics because of its implications
for long-term cross-country income, economic growth and convergence of countries. Access
to knowledge and know-how are obtained by MNC a¢ liates from their parents, as well as
via spillovers from those a¢ liates to domestic rms. Regardless of how such knowledge is
gathered, it amounts to an avenue for innovation and income growth. Based on the results
mentioned above, this study points to policy implications for countries to raise their produc-
tivity levels. Taking into account that the presence of MNC a¢ liates and the performance
of those a¢ liates are contributing factors to the productivity levels of a country, policymak-
ers should also think about creating more appealing atmosphere for MNCs, including such
factors as favorable entry criteria and tax implications.
While this paper provides initial evidence on the relationship between the technology
gap and the mode of technology transfer in multinational corporations, there are important
extensions that should be considered in future work. First, obtaining rm-level or more
disaggregated industry data will enable to the examination of this question without potential
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aggregation bias. Second, it would be interesting to add a direct measure of technology, and
explicitly model the process of innovation in the framework of technology transfer. Third, it
would be useful to extend this analysis to other samples to see if the results continue to hold.
A promising avenue involves the use of data on Swedish multinationals. In addition, there
are complementarities between productivity and R&D expenditures that this paper has not
addressed. Finally, there are important questions on whether the type of FDI matters for
the mode of technology transfer.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Royalties & license receipts ($mln) 612 19.603 66.554 0 904
US exports of goods for manufacture($mln) 585 161.411 470.192 0 4924
Licensing-Import share 458 0.249 0.290 0 1
Technology gap 514 0.782 0.249 0.001 1.940
Trade costs 583 0.134 0.105 0.008 1.120
R&D ratio (affiliate/parent) 612 0.181 0.082 0.042 0.369
Population 612 10.185 1.425 8.025 14.077
GDP per capita 612 9.412 0.833 6.798 10.597
Intellectual property protection 599 1.201 0.309 0.207 1.541
Human capital per worker 598 -7.088 1.562 -11.592 -4.958
Physical capital per worker 579 5.841 2.211 -0.276 10.028
The sample includes 47 countries, 7 manufacturing industries and 2 years (1999 and 2004). Trade costs,
population, GDP per capita, IPR, human capital and physical capital per worker are in natural
logarithms.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Licensing-Import Share
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Table 2: Industry Averages of Main Variables
Industry
Mean of
licensing-
import
share
Mean of
technology
gap
Chemicals 0.354 0.899
Computers 0.102 0.937
Electronics 0.236 0.744
Food 0.431 0.516
Machinery 0.24 0.752
Metals 0.238 0.559
Transportation 0.158 0.826
Table 3: Country Averages of Main Variables
Country
Mean of
licensing-
import
share
Mean of
technology
gap
Country
Mean of
licensing-
import
share
Mean of
technology
gap
Argentina 0.052 0.878 Italy 0.261 0.746
Australia 0.159 0.713 Japan 0.178 0.705
Austria 0.320 0.551 Korea: Republic of 0.205 0.773
Belgium 0.171 0.654 Malaysia 0.194 0.843
Brazil 0.043 0.746 Mexico 0.050 0.742
Chile 0.148 0.833 Netherlands 0.141 0.687
China 0.212 0.903 New Zealand 0.114 0.845
Colombia 0.081 0.752 Norway 0.218 0.702
Costa Rica 0.230 0.783 Peru 0.493 0.831
Czech Republic 0.397 0.842 Philippines 0.363 0.892
Denmark 0.211 0.676 Poland 0.358 0.806
Ecuador 0.163 1.050 Portugal 0.499 0.746
Egypt 0.589 0.921 Russia 0.365 0.904
Finland 0.247 0.692 Saudi Arabia 0.914 1.016
France 0.152 0.679 Singapore 0.091 0.800
Germany 0.168 0.705 South Africa 0.176 0.854
Greece 0.810 0.699 Spain 0.327 0.726
Honduras 0.292 0.654 Sweden 0.366 0.687
Hong Kong 0.079 0.864 Switzerland 0.365 0.500
Hungary 0.379 0.719 Taiwan 0.081 0.726
India 0.131 0.904 Turkey 0.814 0.863
Indonesia 0.334 0.950 United Kingdom 0.101 0.717
Ireland 0.221 0.556 Venezuela 0.326 0.672
Israel 0.123 0.806
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Table 4: Benchmark Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Licensing-Import Share
Technology gap -0.188*** -0.164*** -0.163*** -0.156** -0.150** -0.118*
(0.063) (0.058) (0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062)
Trade costs 0.398** 0.396** 0.421** 0.504** 0.640***
(0.188) (0.196) (0.201) (0.233) (0.194)
R&D ratio 0.012 0.021 0.028 0.075
(0.182) (0.182) (0.187) (0.179)
Population -0.513 -1.330*** -0.016
(0.386) (0.344) (0.101)
GDP per capita 0.371*** 0.233* -0.160*
(0.135) (0.133) (0.082)
IPR protection index 0.089* 0.106
(0.053) (0.116)
Human capital per worker -0.333 -0.068
(0.204) (0.094)
Physical capital per
worker -0.027 0.087
(0.057) (0.054)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 425 408 408 408 398 398
R-squared 0.363 0.378 0.378 0.383 0.381 0.095
Notes:  All specifications include year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors which allow for clustering
by country-year are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Various Econometric Specifications
OLS
Robust
Regression
Median
Regression
Tobit
Fractional
Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Licensing-Import Share
Technology gap -0.150** -0.065** -0.108*** -0.168** -0.990***
(0.061) (0.027) (0.000) (0.068) (0.361)
Trade costs 0.504** 0.673*** 0.678*** 0.606** 3.317**
(0.233) (0.087) (0.000) (0.271) (1.448)
R&D ratio 0.028 -0.136 -0.140*** -0.051 0.202
(0.187) (0.087) (0.000) (0.215) (1.149)
Population -1.330*** -1.010** -0.931*** -1.531*** -7.282***
(0.344) (0.434) (0.000) (0.432) (2.276)
GDP per capita 0.233* 0.112 0.090*** 0.272* 1.711**
(0.133) (0.141) (0.000) (0.157) (0.686)
IPR protection index 0.089* 0.061 0.120*** 0.086 0.593
(0.053) (0.065) (0.000) (0.062) (0.373)
Human capital per worker -0.333 -0.001 -0.328*** -0.331 -2.132*
(0.204) (0.159) (0.000) (0.246) (1.225)
Physical capital per worker -0.027 0.025 0.075*** -0.012 -0.451
(0.057) (0.029) (0.000) (0.073) (0.433)
Observations 398 398 398 398 398
R-squared 0.381 0.763
Notes:  All specifications include country and year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. Robust standard errors which allow for clustering by country-year are
reported in models (1), (4) and (5). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Decomposition of Licensing-Import Share
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable
Licensing-
Import
Share
Intermediate
goods import
Intensity
Royalty &
license fee
intensity
Technology gap -0.150** 0.035** -0.000
(0.061) (0.016) (0.002)
Trade costs 0.504** -0.166*** 0.023***
(0.233) (0.063) (0.009)
R&D ratio 0.028 -0.107* -0.017*
(0.187) (0.060) (0.009)
Population -1.330*** 0.037 -0.041*
(0.344) (0.166) (0.021)
GDP per capita 0.233* 0.041 -0.002
(0.133) (0.061) (0.006)
IPR protection index 0.089* -0.027 0.002
(0.053) (0.019) (0.002)
Human capital per worker -0.333 -0.034 -0.011
(0.204) (0.045) (0.008)
Physical capital per worker -0.027 -0.006 -0.001
(0.057) (0.007) (0.001)
Observations 398 385 385
R-squared 0.381 0.417 0.213
Notes: All specifications include country and year fixed effects.  Robust
standard errors which allow for clustering by country-year are reported in
parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Alternative Measures of Technology Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Licensing-Import Share
Technology gap (weighted) -0.150**
(0.061)
Technology gap (unweighted) -0.117**
(0.055)
Technology gap (affiliate frontier ) -0.147**
(0.073)
Technology gap using number of affiliates -0.132
(0.081)
Trade costs 0.504** 0.583** 0.728*** 0.572**
(0.233) (0.248) (0.261) (0.265)
R&D ratio 0.028 0.338** 0.442** 0.559***
(0.187) (0.167) (0.182) (0.205)
Population -1.330*** -1.245*** -1.452*** -1.295***
(0.344) (0.426) (0.443) (0.340)
GDP per capita 0.233* 0.122 0.254* 0.347***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.146) (0.096)
IPR protection index 0.089* 0.102* 0.110* 0.080
(0.053) (0.055) (0.057) (0.049)
Human capital per worker -0.333 -0.301 -0.380* -0.381**
(0.204) (0.204) (0.196) (0.192)
Physical capital per worker -0.027 0.002 -0.023 -0.044
(0.057) (0.044) (0.058) (0.041)
Observations 398 396 486 472
R-squared 0.381 0.399 0.338 0.361
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors which allow for
clustering by country-year are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2 "International Business Travel: An Engine of Innovation?"
(with Wolfgang Keller)
2.1 Introduction
Throughout history the cross-border ows of workers had major e¤ects on the innovative
activity and growth of countries. In the year 1789, for example, at a time when England had
banned the international movement of skilled craftsmen so as to keep important technology
from spreading, a certain Samuel Slater succeeded to disguise himself and slipped out on a
ship to the United States, where he built the rst water-powered textile mill and became
known as the father of the American Industrial Revolution. Today blueprints can be trans-
ferred electronically over the Internet, or technologies are shipped at relatively low costs as
capital goods. Does this mean that cross-border labor movements play no role anymore for
innovation? In this paper we provide new evidence on this question by studying the impact
of short-term business travel.
Cross-border worker ows bring domestic entrepreneurs into personal contact with for-
eigners who are familiar with foreign technology. Domestic innovation may rise because
innovation is incremental, and knowledge of prior art helps. Technology is also often tacit 
it is di¢ cult to fully characterize , and face-to-face communication is more e¤ective than
other forms for transferring technology.33 Nevertheless we know quite little on the impact
of cross-border worker ows on innovation. In this paper, we employ a new industry-level
33Polanyi (1958) discusses the tacitness of technological knowledge. See Koskinen and Vanharanta (2002)
on the role of face-to-face communication in overcoming problems arising from the tacitness of technology,
and Forbes (2009) as well as Harvard Business Review (2009) on the general preference of business executives
for face-to-face meetings over phone or web-based communications.
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dataset to examine the impact of business travelers from the United States on patenting in
36 countries over the period of 1993 to 2003. Our main nding is that business travelers
coming to a country have a positive impact on that countrys rate of innovation. Quanti-
tatively, a 10% increase in business travelers increases patenting on average by about 0.3%,
and in the typical case business travel from the United States accounts for about 1% of the
total di¤erence in patenting across countries. Moreover, we nd evidence that the impact of
inward business travel on patenting is increasing in the technological knowledge carried by
each particular traveler.
While international trade in goods and foreign direct investment (FDI) have long been
the subject of investigation, there is much less research on international trade in services,
even though by now services trade is substantial in many countries. For example, services
exports are now close to 40% of U.S. goods exports.34 This paper sheds new light on the
impact of international air travel. This provides new information for the gains from services
liberalizations, both bilaterally (such as the Open Skies Agreement) and multilaterally among
the members of the World Trade Organization.35 While researchers have started to look at
the role of international business travel in facilitating goods trade (Poole 2010, Cristea 2011),
we examine the role of business travel on innovation taking the trade in goods as well as FDI
as given.
The di¤usion of knowledge and ideas is central to macroeconomics because of its implica-
tions for the long-run convergence of incomes (Lucas 1993, Aghion and Howitt 1998, Howitt
2000, Jones 2002, and Alvarez, Buera, and Lucas 2008). It is an open question whether
34News release of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 11, 2011.
35The Open Skies Agreement seeks to liberalize air travel to and from the United States, see
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra/ata/. WTO (2006) discusses key multilateral issues.
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knowledge can be transferred exclusively in disembodied form (as a blueprint) or whether
knowledge transfer also requires the movement of people, for example the Western settler
migration that brought new ideas of institutions to the New World (Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001). In some recent research knowledge is indeed assumed to be fully embod-
ied in people (Burstein and Monge-Naranjo 2009) so that international travel is crucial for
knowledge di¤usion.
The importance of personal contacts for international technology transfer has been es-
tablished in micro empirical work by a number of researchers. Common ethnicity may lower
the cost of transferring knowledge from one country to another (Kerr 2008).36 Moreover,
movements of scientists themselves can be a conduit of international knowledge ows (Oettl
and Agrawal 2008, Kim, Lee, and Marschke 2006). While we focus on knowledge transfer
that comes about through face-to-face meetings in a large number (more than 100,000) of
business trips, these papers are complementary to our research.
There are a few papers that have considered air travel as a conduit for technology trans-
fer. Results have been mixed. Gambardella, Mariani, and Torrisi (2009) in their analysis
of European regions nd that air passengers are not signicantly related to productivity
di¤erences once other determinants are controlled for. In contrast, Andersen and Dalgaard
(2011) employ World Tourism Organization data to show that the number of air travelers
relative to population can explain cross-country productivity di¤erences.37 A concern with
data on international travel is that the denitions vary substantially across countries inter-
36Network membership often lowers the costs of interaction (Rauch 2001), and to verify membership face-
to-face meetings will often be useful. See also Singh (2005), Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale (2006), and
Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale (2008).
37See also the work by Le (2008) and Dowrick and Tani (2011).
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national travel data is not nearly as consistent across countries as data on FDI or on trade
in goods. In this paper this issue is addressed by focusing on travel data collected by a single
country (the United States). We can also separate business from leisure travelers, which is
important because leisure travelers should matter much less for technology transfer. Finally,
our research is unique in analyzing the impact of business travel on patenting as opposed to
productivity. Patenting is an activity that we can directly observe in the data. This makes
the analysis less prone to confounding factors compared to studying the e¤ects of travel on
productivity, because the latter is di¢ cult to measure with the available data.38
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section gives an overview of the
empirical analysis and also highlights important aspects of the estimation methods. Section
3 describes the data that will be used, with more details given in the Appendix. All empirical
results are presented in section 4, while section 5 contains a concluding discussion of our
ndings.
2.2 An Empirical Model of Innovation through Cross-BorderMove-
ments
We are interested to estimate the impact of international business travel on the rate of
innovation across countries and industries. Innovation is measured in terms of the countries
patents at the level of 37 industries. The industry dimension is important because industries
vary greatly in terms of patenting activity. While patent data is available even by industry,
information on business travel is much more scarce. This paper employs data on outward
38Productivity often captures not only technical e¢ ciency but also demand shocks and market power,
factor market distortions, and product mix changes (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson 2008, Hsieh and
Klenow 2009, and Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2010, respectively). See Keller (2004) for more discussion.
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business travel of U.S. residents (who are predominantly U.S. citizens) to other countries.39
The focus on one source country means that the spells of business travel are more comparable
than if we had used data from multiple countries that might use di¤erent approaches in data
collection. Moreover, we limit the analysis of patenting to patent applications in the United
States, both to ensure a common quality standard across countries and because the United
States is an important market for all of the countries in our sample.
Our approach is straightforward. We specify patenting in a particular country c in
industry i; Pci as a function 	 of inward business travelers from the United States, Bc and
of other observed and unobserved determinants, Zc :
Pci = 	 (Bc; Zc;) ; (1)
where  is a vector of unknown parameters. Equation (1) can be thought of as the reduced
form of a model in which technological knowledge di¤uses abroad through business travel
and other channels. Specically, Keller and Yeaple (2012) analyze rms that decide whether
to produce intermediate goods that are inputs in a nal good either at home or abroad.
Since home managers have the necessary know-how for production, the manufacturing of
any intermediate at home entails only the trade cost as the intermediate is shipped for as-
sembly abroad. If, however, the intermediate is to be produced abroad the know-how has to
be transferred between home and host country managers, which is subject to communication
frictions because technological knowledge has frequently tacit elements. The model posits a
trade-o¤ of technology transfer in embodied form through trade and through direct commu-
39Thanks go to Jennifer Poole who shared the outcome of her NSF-funded data collection with us.
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nication associated with FDI production. A role for business travel in enhancing technology
transfer naturally arises if home country managers can travel to the host country. Face-to-
face time enhances technology transfer but it may also mean that una¢ liated host country
agents learn about the technology.
The theoretical framework suggests that for estimating the impact of business travel
on innovation it will be important to condition on FDI- and trade relations between coun-
tries. Moreover, below we will adopt a control function approach to address endogeneity
issues, in particular the possibility that patenting and business travel are both related to a
common shock. Another aspect of our analysis is that the number of patents, Pci; is a non-
negative count variable. Consequently least-squares, which assumes unbounded support, is
not appropriate. Instead the analysis will rely on negative binomial regressions, which is a
well-established model for count data. The negative binomial model assumes that the de-
pendent variable follows a Poisson-type process. The main di¤erence compared to a Poisson
regression is that the negative binomial model does not assume equality between the mean
and the variance.40
Before presenting the estimation equation and turning to the results, the next section
gives an overview of the data.
40Cameron and Trivedi (2005) discuss count data models more generally; see also the arguments for
Poisson-like regression models put forward in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Innovation
The dependent variable in our analysis is the number of U.S. patents to foreign country
inventors in the years 1993 to 2003 in 37 industries as recorded by the United States Patent
and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO). As noted above, focusing on foreign patents in the U.S. en-
sures that all inventions surpass the same quality standard, and moreover, patent protection
in the United States will typically be important for major inventions given the importance
of the U.S. market. This data comes from the custom data extracts of the USPTO data-
base, which has information on country of residence for each of possibly several inventors per
patent, original USPTO patent classication, as well as the application month and year.41
In the case of n > 1 inventors, we assign a fraction of 1=n to each inventors country of
residence. Based on USPTO classication, patents are assigned to NBER 37 technological
subcategories (or, industries).42 A list of industries is provided in table A1 of the Appendix.
The main dependent variable in the empirical analysis is the sum of these fractional patent
counts aggregated by foreign country and industry for each quarter during the period 1993
to 2003.43
In addition, we employ the USPTO individual inventor database to separate out foreign
patents that have a U.S. co-inventor. These patents are of particular interest because the
traveler might in fact be the U.S. co-inventor on that patent. For this reason, we believe
41We focus on the date of application as opposed to the date of when the patent is granted; this ensures
that di¤erences in the processing time of patents do not play a role.
42See Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2001).
43The use of fractions means that our data is not strictly speaking count data; despite this we prefer to
employ count data regression models. More information on the patent data construction is given in the
Appendix.
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that the relationship between business travel and domestic innovation might be particularly
strong for these patents. How frequent are patent applications that have a U.S. co-inventor?
We nd that on average about one in 60 of all foreign patent applications in the United
States during the sample period had foreign and U.S. co-inventors.
It is well-known that a principal determinant of the rate of innovation is the countrys
R&D expenditures. We have obtained this data from OECD Statistics.44 We also include
two other measures of innovation, namely a countrys total patent applications in a particular
year, both by residents of that country as well as by non-residents (source: World Intellectual
Property Organization).45 These variables control for innovative cycles in each country that
are general in the sense that they are not specically related to travel from the United States.
In addition, including all patents on the right hand side controls for the patent family e¤ect,
namely that a patent application in the U.S. reects only the fact that a given technology
has been invented and patented at home in the same period.
2.3.2 Travel
The information on international air travel in this paper comes from the Survey of Interna-
tional Air Travelers (SIAT) which is conducted by the International Trade Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce. This survey provides information on travel from the United
States to foreign countries for U.S. residents for each quarter during the years 1993 to 2003.
The data has information on the travelersU.S. county of residence, the foreign city of des-
tination, the purpose of the travel, and the travelers occupation. Matching this information
44OECD statistics provide Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D for OECD and also some non-member
countries.
45The assignment of these patents to countries is based only on the rst inventor.
39
on travel with other parts of our data set required aggregation, and the basic unit of ob-
servation is resident travelers from a U.S. state to a given foreign country for each quarter
during the years 1993 to 2003.
While we do not have specic information on the technological knowledge carried by each
traveler, we account for di¤erences in this respect by incorporating information on patent
stocks (a measure of technological prowess) at the level of the U.S. states and industries.
Our business traveler variable,Bcqti, is dened as follows:
Bcqti =
X
sS
Psqt
GSPsqt| {z }
State
 Piqt|{z}
Industry
 ~Bscqt;8i; q; t; (2)
where the variable Psqt is the patent stock of U.S. state s in quarter q of year t; GSPsqt is the
states gross product, Piqt is the patent stock of U.S. industry i in quarter q of year t; and
~Bscqt is the raw (unweighted) number of business travelers from state s to foreign country c
in quarter q of year t. Equation (2) captures two dimensions of di¤erences in technological
knowledge. First, U.S. travelers coming from a state with a high patent-to-GSP ratio are
more likely to a¤ect innovation abroad than travelers that come from low-patenting states.
This origin e¤ect is the part labeled State in equation (2). Second, a given traveler is more
likely to carry knowledge relevant for industry i if that industry in the United States is large
in terms of its patenting; this e¤ect is labeled Industry in equation (2). The patent gures by
state and industry come from the les of the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO),
and the gross product levels by state come from the U.S. Department of Commerces Bureau
of Economic Analysis. U.S. state and industry-level patent statistics are summarized in
Table A2 of the Appendix.
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Analogously to the weighted number of business travelers from the United States accord-
ing to equation (2), we also compute the numbers of travelers who are visitors, are traveling
for religious reasons, are retired, or are homemakers. These variables will be employed in
our empirical analysis in form of a control function discussed below.
2.3.3 Other Variables
The size and level of development of a country a¤ects its patenting in the United States,
and for this reason we include information on population size and GDP per capita (source:
Penn World Tables, version 6.2). As noted above it is also important to control for other
channels of international technology transfer, such as international trade and FDI (see the
review in Keller 2010). The regressions include U.S. exports to each of the sample countries,
as well as the total sales of U.S. majority-owned multinational a¢ liates in each of the sample
countries.
Summary statistics of the data are presented in Table 1. The rst two rows show some
descriptive statistics on fractional patent counts by foreign inventors and joint U.S./foreign
patent counts. There is a lot of variation in U.S. patenting by foreign countries and industries
as evidenced by the standard deviation in both foreign U.S. patent counts as well as joint U.S.
patent counts. A list of the 36 countries that are included in this analysis is given in Table
A3 of the Appendix. The following four rows in Table 1 present (in natural logarithms)
U.S. resident travel data for business, religious, and visitor purposes, along with data on
travelers that are retired and homemakers.46 As can be seen from the table, the number of
46In this analysis we focus on positive numbers of business travelers, as our analysis does not necessary
apply to patenting in the case when there is no business travel.
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travelers for the purpose of business and visitor are close in magnitude, while the number of
observations for religious travel and retired and homemaker travel is much smaller.
We now turn to the empirical results.
2.4 Empirical Results
The estimation equation we will be using is as follows:
E [PcqtijBcqti] = exp

 lnBcqti +  lnXcqti + c + q + t + i + "cqti

(3)
where Pcqti, the expected patent counts of a country c in the United States in quarter q of
year t and industry i is a function of Bcqti; the number of business travelers at that time
between country c and the U.S. (from equation 2), other determinants Xcqti of country cs
patenting in the U.S. (such as R&D expenditures), country-, quarter-, year- and industry
xed e¤ects (the s), and an error term, "cqti. In our data, the variance of patents exceeds its
mean (overdispersion) and the negative binomial model is generally preferred to the Poisson
model.47 We begin with simple negative binomial regressions before moving to a control
function approach to deal with possible endogeneity.
The initial results are shown in Table 2. In columns 1 to 5, the dependent variable is
the foreign countrys patent counts taken out at the U.S. patent o¢ ce, while in column 6
the dependent variable is foreign patents that have U.S. coinventors. All regressions include
country, year, quarter and industry xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors which allow for
47We have also considered zero-inatednegative binomial regressions, however, they do not lead to a
major improvement in empirical t.
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clustering by country-year are reported in parentheses.48 Column 1 shows that there is a
strong correlation between patenting and travel from the United States, which is only slightly
reduced with the inclusion of controls for size and level of development in column 2: the
coe¢ cient on business travel decreases from 0.056 to 0.053.
Next we include controls for domestic technology investments as well as international
technology transfer. U.S. FDI and U.S. exports have a positive coe¢ cient, although only
FDI is signicant. The inclusion of these variables lowers the business travel coe¢ cient
slightly. In column 4, we include R&D expenditures, which has a highly signicant impact
on patenting. With the inclusion of R&D expenditures, U.S. FDI becomes insignicant,
while in contrast the coe¢ cient on business travel is largely unchanged.
Recall that the left-hand side variable is a countrys industry-level patenting in the United
States. In column 5 the patenting of the country in all countries of the world is added, where
we distinguish resident from non-resident patenting. This controls for technology and other
shocks that lead to changes in a countrys overall patenting. We see that resident patenting
is more strongly correlated with the countrys patenting in the United States, a plausible
result that holds throughout our analysis. With the inclusion of all control variables, the
business travel coe¢ cient is estimated at just under 5%. Population size, domestic R&D
expenditures and resident patent applications are associated with higher patenting in the
U.S., while neither U.S. FDI nor U.S. exports have a signicantly positive e¤ect on the rate
of patenting.
We now turn to a preliminary analysis of the economic magnitude implied by these
48We cluster by country-year because some of the variables do not vary by quarter and by industry; for
example, GDP per capita for a given year is employed for all four quarters of that year and all industries. In
contrast, patents on the left and the business variable on the right-hand side vary by quarter and industry.
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estimates. The size of the business travel coe¢ cient suggests that a 10% increase in business
travelers from the U.S. is associated with an about 0.5% higher number of patent applications
in the United States. If we focus on foreign patents with U.S. co-inventors, the coe¢ cient
estimate for business traveler is about 0.07, see column 6, compared to 0.05 for all U.S.
patents in column 5. The nding of a larger coe¢ cient for U.S. business travelers when U.S.
persons are co-inventors on certain patents is consistent with stronger international transfer
through travel for these technologies.49
In the previous regressions the relationship between patenting and business travel may
be a¤ected by unobserved shocks which would lead to biased estimates. In particular, we are
concerned that E[Bcqti; "cqti] > 0; because this would lead to an upward bias in the business
travel coe¢ cient. One possible reason for this may be shocks to the business climate in a
country that attract both U.S. business travelers while at the same time stimulating patenting
activity in a country. Our approach is to construct a control function such that when it is
included in the regression the correlation of business travel and the new regression error is
zero.50 The control function that we propose is the residual of a regression of business travel
on visitor travel. Consider the following ordinary least-squares regression:
lnBcqti = c + q + t + i + 1 lnVcqti + 2Xcqti + !cqti; (4)
where Vcqti is the number of visitor travelers between the U.S. and country c in quarter q
49An interesting result is that U.S. FDI is negative and signicant at 10% when the dependent variable
is foreign patents with U.S. co-inventors. A possible explanation for this is that if a U.S. person has a joint
patent with a foreign inventor, the former is less likely to engage in FDI in that country to protect the
invention.
50Control function approaches have been widely applied in the estimation of productivity, perhaps starting
with Olley and Pakes (1996); Blundell and Powell (2003) give an overview and provide general results on
the control function approach.
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of year t and industry i, where visitor travel is dened as travel intended to meet family
and friends. Note that the estimated residual !^cqti of this regression will tend to be high
whenever business travel is high relative to visitor travel, conditional on all covariates. This
residual will serve as the control function in our setting.
For example, a new direct air connection between a particular U.S. state and a particular
foreign country c will typically lead to an increase in business travel but it will also increase
visitor travel. Thus there are many instances in which business and visitor travel will be
correlated. In Figure 1, we show the 10-year di¤erences for visitor versus business travel in
our data by country. There is a strong correlation, which also exists for shorter periods of
time.
The logic of the control function approach lies in the fact that !^cqti will pick up instances
when the relationship of business to visitor travel is unusual (in the sense of away from the
regression line shown in Figure 1). For example, if foreign country c improves its business
conditions by lowering corporate taxes, this will tend to increase business travel. Because the
lower taxes might also stimulate patenting in country c; this would not constitute the exoge-
nous variation that is needed to estimate the causal impact of business travel on patenting.
However, augmenting the estimating equation with the (time-varying) control function !^cqti;
E [PcqtijBcqti; !^cqti] = exp

 lnBcqti +  lnXcqti + c + q + t + i + !^cqti + "cqti

(5)
allows to consistently estimate the impact of business travel on patenting because the reduc-
tion in taxes will raise business travel relative to visitor travel, which according to equation
(4) will increase the control function !^cqti: In sum, identication in this control function
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approach comes from changes in business travel conditional on changes in protability, tech-
nological capability, and all other factors that are captured by shifts in the business-visitor
traveler relationship.
The main identication assumption is that visitor travelers do not transfer technology.
Of course, visitor travel might convey basic information about foreign countries and their
economies, but this is likely already captured by country-, industry-, and time xed e¤ects.
Arguably the identication assumption is reasonable because the primary motive of visiting
family and friends is to maintain personal relations. While the assumption cannot be tested,
we will present some evidence indicating that it holds in the present context in Table 6 below.
Table 3 shows the results from a number of control function regressions (equation 4
above). Column 1 corresponds to visitor travel as the only control variable, while columns
2, 3, 4 and 5 successively include additional control variables, namely the number of persons
traveling who are retired, the number of persons who travel for religious reasons, and the
number of travelers that are homemakers. As for visitors, persons who travel for religious
purposes or are, in terms of their occupation, retired or homemakers, it is reasonable to
assume that they are not importantly involved in the transfer of technological knowledge.
The results for these regressions indicate that all control variables are positively correlated
with business travel, and all with the exception of religious travel are signicant. The most
important predictor is visitor travel, probably because visitor travel is relatively common,
see the summary statistics in Table 1.
Table 4 shows the results of the control function approach. The control functions !^1 to !^5
from Table 3 are included in the negative binomial regressions, as in equation (5). The rst
column repeats the baseline results from Table 2, column 5 with a coe¢ cient of 4.9% for the
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business traveler variable. If endogeneity generates an upward bias in this coe¢ cient, upon
inclusion of the control function it is expected that the coe¢ cient on business travel will
decrease, and that the coe¢ cient on !^ itself is positive. Indeed, we nd that the coe¢ cient
on the business travel variable falls, from 4.9% in column 1 to around 2.8% and signicant
in columns 2 to 6. The control function point estimates are between 5.8% and 6.5%, highly
signicant at 1%. Turning to the results for foreign patent applications in the United States
with U.S. co-inventors on the right side of Table 4, we see that the control function correction
has qualitatively the same e¤ect on the business travel coe¢ cient, which comes down from
about 7 to 6%, while here the control function is not signicant. The likely reason for lower
precision in the control function is the relatively small set of joint foreign and U.S. patents.51
Overall, these results indicate that there is a signicant e¤ect of business travel on domestic
innovation.
What are the economic magnitudes that our estimates yield? Take Austria and Belgium,
two countries of similar size and level of development. It turns out that during the sample
period covered by the survey around 2,300 business travelers from the United States went to
Belgium, compared to just below 1,400 that went to Austria. This overall di¤erence makes
for about 3 U.S. business travelers in our sample going to the average industry per year
in Belgium, whereas the number of U.S. business travelers per industry and year going to
Austria was about 2. At the same time, the mean patenting in Belgium was 5.7, compared
to 4.5 in Austria.
We can use our estimates from Table 4 to gauge the importance of international busi-
51When using U.S. joint patents as a dependent variable, visitor only control function turns very small
(virtually zero), most likely because of small set of joint foreign and U.S. patents.
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ness travel from the U.S. in accounting for this di¤erence of 1.2 in mean patenting. The
coe¢ cient on business travel is 0.028, so the predicted patenting premium in Belgium over
Austria attributable to the higher number of U.S. business travelers is about 0.012 (equal to
exp[0:028ln(3)] exp[0:028ln(2)]), or about 1% of the total di¤erence. While this is a rel-
atively small number, this e¤ect comes from travel from a single (albeit important) country,
the United States. The contribution of travel from all countries in explaining variation in
the patenting rates across countries is probably a small multiple of that. Another way to as-
sess the economic importance of business travel for patenting is to compare it with domestic
R&D expenditures. We calculate that business travel is 1=5 as important as domestic R&D
in accounting for patenting di¤erences using marginal e¤ects of our estimated coe¢ cients.
Overall, our results suggest that international business travel explains a signicant and small
to moderate portion of di¤erences in the rate of patenting across countries.
These results come from a large sample of industries, where patenting is much more im-
portant is some industries than in others. In the following we examine whether the estimated
relationship between business travel and innovation holds for high versus low patenting in-
dustries.52 The results are shown in Table 5. Column 1 repeats for convenience the baseline
estimates without the control function (from Table 4, column 1), while in columns 2 and 3
in addition to business travel an interaction of business travel with high patenting dummy
(based on median or mean) is included. It is apparent that the impact of business travel on
innovation is greater in high patenting industries: the coe¢ cient on business travel in high
52In order to correctly identify high versus low patenting industries, we take into account that our sample
spans vastly di¤erent countries some of which patent more than others. For the following table median and
mean of patents are created based on country-industry combination. High patenting dummy is dened to be
1 if patent counts for a given country c in quarter q of year t and industry i is higher than median/mean.
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patenting industries is around 0.3 compared to business travel overall 0.05 (column 1). It is
somewhat of a puzzle that business travel has a negative impact in low-patenting industries,
however, this may be due to correlation among the independent variables.
In columns 4 to 6, we show analogous results using the preferred control function ap-
proach. Baseline estimates with the control function (Table 4, column 6) are repeated in
column 4. Columns 5 and 6 present estimates with control function for pure business travel
coe¢ cient as well as a separate control function for interaction. The results show that both
without and with the control function correction, business travel has a more sizeable e¤ect
on innovation in high patenting industries.
Next we perform two important specication checks, see Table 6. In the rst part of
the table (columns 1-5) we examine the importance of di¤erences in terms of technological
knowledge of the travelers, which we account for by weighing travel by the U.S. states
and industry patent stocks (equation 2 above). In columns 1-5 results from employing
unweighted business travel variables are shown, in comparison to our baseline (weighted)
business travel variable. In the basic specication in column 2, the coe¢ cient on business
travel is essentially zero as opposed to about 0.03 (Table 4). Specically, for all foreign patent
applications in the U.S., the point estimate falls from 3% to essentially zero. In the case of
the foreign patents with U.S. co-inventors, the unweighted business travel estimate is also
very small, whereas the patent-stock weighted business travel has a coe¢ cient of about 0.06.
We conclude that accounting for technological knowledge heterogeneity is very important in
studying the impact of business travel on domestic innovation.
To check the importance of business versus visitor travel, both (weighted) business and
visitor travel are included in the same regression, columns 6 and 7 of Table 6. In column
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6 where the dependent variable is all U.S. patent applications, with the addition of visitor
travel the size of the business travel coe¢ cient increases (still signicant) while visitor travel
turns negative. This may be due to collinearity of the business and visitor traveler variables
shown in Figure 1. In the case with joint foreign/U.S. patents, business travel remains highly
positive and signicant, while the coe¢ cient on visitor travel is virtually zero. This supports
our assumption that it is business travel that matters for international technology transfer,
and not other types of air travel.
We have also conducted a number of other robustness checks. First, we have employed
the domestic patenting variable (resident and non-resident) lagged by one year so as to
reduce the possibility that patent applications in the U.S. simply mirror domestic patent
applications. This turns out to yield similar results. Second, we have lagged the business
traveler variable by one year, exploring the idea that it might take some time until business
travel from the U.S. translates into domestic innovation. Also this leads to similar although
somewhat lower estimates. Overall this analysis indicates that the estimated impact from
U.S. business travel on foreign countriesrates of innovation is robust.
We now turn to a concluding discussion.
2.5 Conclusions
We have argued that face-to-face meetings might be particularly important for the transfer
of technology, because technology is tacit, and therefore best explained and demonstrated in
person. Along these lines this paper has examined the impact of inward business travelers
in raising a countrys rate of innovation at the industry level by looking at business travel
from the United States to thirty-six other countries during the years 1993-2003. The results
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indicate that international business travel has a signicant e¤ect. Quantitatively, the impact
of business travel on innovation is sizable. It accounts in the typical industry for about 1%
of the total di¤erence in patenting rates, and its contribution is about one fth of the
contribution of domestic R&D spending. Moreover, there is strong evidence that the impact
on innovation depends on the quality of the technological knowledge carried by each business
traveler.
While international migration has long been a hot topic in debates on labor market
policies, some recent work has started to address another set of policy questions by linking
long-term immigration to innovation in an economy (Peri 2007, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
2010, Stuen, Mobarak, and Maskus 2012). In contrast, our research informs policymakers by
examining how strongly short-term cross-border movements a¤ect innovation. In particular,
given that entry requirements will tend to reduce a countrys number of business travelers,
our results provide some initial guidance on the cost of visa or other entry requirements in
terms of innovation that can be compared to the benets entry barriers might have. Our
analysis also provides a new perspective on other key policy questions, for example the
liberalization of international trade in services. Specically, the nding that business air
travel raises innovation suggests that the liberalization of international passenger air travel,
by lowering fares, might yield substantial gains in terms of economic growth across countries.
Our analysis also highlights the need for good statistical data on international business travel,
a key input for future work on this topic.53
While our results suggest that short-term international labor movements could be an
53Fortunately, there are some signs that international agencies are moving into this direction. In particular,
the 2008 guidelines of the World Tourism Organization aim at distinguishing business and professional from
leisure travelers more clearly; see http://www.unwto.org/statistics/irts/annex.pdf
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important way through which cross-country income di¤erences can be reduced, more work
needs to be done. One, it will be interesting to compare our results to studies employing
alternative sources of identication, such as policy changes and quasi-natural experiments.
Two, an important question is whether the strength of the e¤ect depends strongly on coun-
try and sectoral characteristics, as has been shown for technology transfer through trade
and FDI (see De Loecker 2007 and Keller and Yeaple 2009, respectively). In our setting, a
promising direction of future work may be to include more geographic detail, perhaps isolat-
ing key states, such as California. Three, it would be interesting to see whether a countrys
own outward business travel is a¤ecting innovation as strongly, or even more strongly, as
the inward business travel from the United States. Finally, there are important questions
regarding the degree of complementarity between cross-border travel, trade, and FDI that
future work needs to address.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: 10-year Differences of Business and Visitor Travel, 1993-2003
53
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
US Patenting
US patent counts 26.306 81.471 0 930
Joint US patent counts 0.443 1.541 0 40
US Resident Travel
Business travel 0.843 0.987 0 7.294
Visitor travel 0.732 0.995 0 7.305
Religious travel 0.021 0.158 0 3.945
Retired travel 0.412 0.762 0 6.355
Homemaker travel 0.214 0.537 0 6.087
Other Variables
Population 10.230 1.504 5.609 14.068
Real GDP per capita 9.718 0.577 7.599 10.843
US exports 22.745 1.388 18.062 25.436
US FDI 24.069 1.617 16.300 26.734
R&D expenditures 22.684 1.408 18.672 25.385
Patent applications, non-residents 7.824 1.852 0 10.958
Patent applications, residents 8.259 2.197 0 12.859
Number of observations for all variables is 16,992.  All variables, except US Patent
Counts and Joint US Patent Counts are in natural logarithms. Real GDP per capita,
US exports, US FDI and R&D expenditures are in dollars. US FDI is total sales of
majority owned multinational firms.
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Table 3: Control Function Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Business travel
Visitor travel 0.738** 0.673** 0.673** 0.624** 0.624**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Retired travel 0.112** 0.111** 0.093** 0.092**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Religious travel 0.036 0.021
(0.028) (0.029)
Homemaker travel 0.155** 0.155**
(0.012) (0.012)
Population -0.594** -0.548** -0.549** -0.540** -0.540**
(0.191) (0.189) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188)
Real GDP per capita -0.051 -0.023 -0.024 -0.003 -0.004
(0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
US exports 0.034 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.026
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
US FDI 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
R&D expenditures 0.066* 0.064+ 0.064+ 0.057+ 0.057+
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Patent applications, non-residents 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Patent applications,  residents 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 16992 16992 16992 16992 16992
R-squared 0.833 0.836 0.836 0.839 0.839
Notes: All specifications include country, year, quarter and industry fixed effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, + p< 0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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3 "Technology Sourcing through International Business Travel"
3.1 Introduction
It is well-known that knowledge creation is concentrated in several countries. Gaining access
to foreign knowledge is important for the economic growth and convergence of countries who
are behind the technological frontier. How does a country tap into foreign knowledge? There
is evidence of technology sourcing through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), international
trade and immigration, but do short-term people ows matter for technology sourcing from
abroad?
This paper addresses the question of the importance of a countrys outward short-term
cross-border people ows for domestic innovation. Business case studies and business jour-
nals stress the importance of face-to-face communication for negotiating deals and selling
products.54 However, as technology is tacit and is hard to codify (Polanyi 1958), personal
contact might indeed be especially important for the transfer of technology. International
business travel can facilitate information exchange and knowledge acquisition, which pro-
motes innovation through inward business travel where foreigners bring knowledge and ideas
with them (Hovhannisyan and Keller 2011). Do foreigners bring technological knowledge
with them, or does a country send its travelers to source such knowledge from abroad? The
hypothesis behind this paper is that business travelers who visit a high-technology country
like the United States can learn about technological knowledge through communication and
face-to-face interaction and can bring that knowledge back to their home country.
This paper provides new evidence that outward business travel impacts domestic inno-
54See surveys of business executives in Harvard Business Review (2009) and Forbes (2009).
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vation, using quarterly data on 84 countriesbusiness travel to the United States between
1993 and 2003. The estimates suggest that on average, a 10 percent increase in outward
business travel increases domestic patenting by 0.3 percent. The approach of estimating the
causal impact of international business travel on innovation uses instruments from variation
of post-September 11, 2001 and relative changes in U.S. visa policy towards Visa Waiver Pro-
gram (VWP) and non-VWP countries (Poole 2010, Neiman and Swagel 2009). The VWP
program enables citizens of certain countries to travel to the United States without a visa
for business or pleasure not to exceed 90 days. These are countries with good ties with the
United States, who o¤er reciprocal visa waiver to U.S. citizens, and who are not considered
a threat to U.S. national security.55 Instrumenting business travel by the exogenous shock
of 9/11 combined with variation from countries with and without travel restrictions, a 10
percent increase in outward business travel to the U.S. from a country increases the countrys
domestic patenting by 3 percent.
There is a vast body of literature on technology sourcing through Foreign Direct Invest-
ment and international trade.56 Outward FDI as a method of sourcing foreign technology
has been studied by a number of authors (e.g. Gri¢ th, Harrison and van Reenen 2006;
Branstetter 2006; Almeida 1996). Gri¢ th and coauthors nd evidence of positive home
country productivity e¤ects from outward FDI in the U.S, while Branstetter and Almeida
nd positive e¤ects on cross-country patent citations. There is also evidence on learning
e¤ects of increased productivity through international trade. A new direction of research
has addressed the importance of business travel for stimulating trade relationships (Poole
55Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.
56See Keller (2010) for a survey.
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2010, Cristea 2011). This previous research reinforces the importance of controlling for FDI
and international trade in the present study.
The second strand of the literature addresses the importance of labor ows as an avenue
for international technology transfer. While the e¤ects of immigration on technology transfer
have been widely studied, research on the e¤ects of short-term international labor ows on
innovation (Hovhannisyan and Keller 2011) and productivity (Andersen and Dalgaard 2011;
Gambardella, Mariani and Torrisi 2009; Dowrick and Tani 2011; Le 2008) is still developing.
Hovhannisyan and Keller nd that inward business travelers to another country from the
United States raise that countrys level of innovation as measured by patenting. In terms
of productivity, Andersen and Dalgaard nd that intensity of air passenger travel scaled by
population helps explain Total Factor Productivity (TFP) di¤erences among countries. A
related study by Dowrick and Tani shows that business travel positively a¤ects industry-level
productivity in Australia.
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of social and personal contacts on
easing technology transfer. The role of collaborative networks for interregional and interrm
technology transfer has been studied by a number of researchers (Singh 2005; Agrawal,
Cockburn and McHale 2006). Choudhury (2010) nds evidence that inventor mobility within
multinational rms is important for knowledge creation. The role of ethnic communities in
international technology transfer has been emphasized by Kerr (2008).
This paper contributes to the rst strand of literature by providing evidence on technology
sourcing through short-term labor ows, as business travel creates an observable channel of
knowledge transmission. In relation to the second body of the literature, this paper nds
that outward business travel to a country is yet another signicant conduit of technology
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transfer. The data used in this paper allows us to specically di¤erentiate business travelers
from other types of travelers, and to use the exogenous variation in post 9/11 travel and U.S.
visa policy changes. This paper also adds to the literature on the importance of face-to-face
communication for knowledge creation and transfer.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the empirical
methodology. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Empirical
results are summarized in section 4, while conclusions are discussed in section 5.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
The goal of this paper is to estimate the relationship between a countrys short-term cross-
border labor ows and innovation. Outward business travel from a country to the United
States over eleven years, from 1993-2003, is related to a countrys level of innovation as
measured by the domestic patent applications of its residents. Since the United States is one
of the most technologically advanced countries, looking for evidence of technology sourcing
through travel to the United States is important.
Patenting in a particular country c in year t; Pct is specied to be a function  of outward
business travel to the United States, Bct and of other observed and unobserved determinants,
Zct:
Pct = (Bct; Zct;) (1)
where  is a vector of unknown parameters. The following equation will be estimated
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E[PctjBcqt] = exp[ lnBcqt +  lnXct + c + t + "ct]; (2)
where Pct is expected domestic patent counts by residents in a country c in year t; Bcqt
is resident business travelers from country c going to the U.S in quarter q of year t; Xct are
other determinants of country c patenting in year t, such as income etc.; and s are country
-, and year- xed e¤ects. It is expected that the coe¢ cient on  will be positive, implying
that business travel increases innovation.
Business travel to the United States from foreign countries can further be disaggregated
by the destination state. States within the U.S. di¤er in their degree of technological advance-
ment, and therefore travel to a high-technology state might have more important benets
for knowledge transfer than travel to a low-technology state. Therefore, business travel to a
U.S. state is weighted by the U.S. states patent stock relative to the states Gross Domestic
Product (GSP) and aggregated over states as follows
Bcqt =
X
s2S
Psqt
GSPsqt
 eBscqt; (3)
where Psqt is the patent stock of state s in quarter q of year t, GSPsqt is real GSP of state
s in quarter q of year t , and eBscqt is the number of business travelers coming to a U.S. state
s from country c in quarter q of year t.
Although the estimation equation (2) presents an initial benchmark on estimating the
relationship between business travel and innovation, the time period as well as a vast sample
of 84 countries with travelers to the U.S. (see the list of countries in Appendix Table A2)
allows us to identify a more causal link. To study the causal impact of travel on innovation,
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this paper employs variation from global conict of September 11, 2001 and Visa Waiver
Program countries (VWP). The Visa Waiver Program, which was founded in 1986, allows
citizens of certain countries to visit the United States without a visa for business or pleasure
not to exceed 90 days. The list of Visa Waiver Program countries during 1993-2003 is
presented in the Appendix Table A1. Of the 84 countries employed in the empirical analysis
(see Appendix Table A2), 24 countries were members of the VWP during some time during
the estimation period. The list of countries used in the analysis which were also VWP
countries can be found in Appendix Table A3.
Travel restrictions in terms of visa requirements and other barriers tend to reduce travel
ows, so that in general, travel to the United States from countries that do not require
a visa (VWP countries) is more frequent than for countries that do (non-VWP countries).
However, increased security checks and delays at the airports, as well as general psychological
factors might impact VWP and non-VWP countries di¤erently.
This paper uses a two-stage analysis to rst estimate business travel from exogenous
variation of unexpected conict of September 11, 2001 and variation from travelers from
VWP versus non-VWP countries. Following Poole (2010), business travel in the rst stage
is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as follows
lnBcqt =  + Sept11qt + VWPcqt + Sept11 VWPcqt + c + t + "cqt; (4)
where Bcqt is weighted business travel to the U.S. from country c in quarter q of year t,
Sept11 is a dummy equal to one for all quarters and years after Sept 11, 2001, VWPcqt is a
dummy equal to 1 for Visa Waiver Program country c in quarter q of year t; s are country-,
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and year- xed e¤ects. Including the interaction e¤ect of Sept11 and VWP program countries
Sept11 VWPcqt, will allow us to estimate the di¤erential e¤ect of 9/11 on countries with
and without travel restrictions. Further, the predicted business travel from the rst stage is
used to estimate equation (2) using methods appropriate for the count data.
Before turning to the empirical results, the next section discusses the data sources and
presents descriptive statistics of the main variables.
3.3 Data
The travel data for this paper comes from the Survey of International Air Travelers (SIAT),
conducted by the O¢ ce of Travel and Tourism Administration, International Trade Admin-
istration, U.S. Department of Commerce. SIAT collects data on non-U.S. residents traveling
to the U.S. and on U.S. residents traveling overseas. This paper uses data on foreign resident
travelers coming to the United States for each quarter between 1993 and 2003.57 It is an
individual-level dataset which includes travelerspurpose of the trip, occupation, country of
residence, country of citizenship and U.S. destination county. Individual-level data is ex-
panded by the main and secondary purposes of the trip, as well as by destination states in
the U.S. if a particular individual traveled to distinct states. Further, expanded individual
travel observations are aggregated by the purpose of the trip by foreign country of residence
and destination U.S. state. Since the empirical analysis will use variation from entry re-
quirements and the Visa Waiver Program, U.S. citizens are dropped from the analysis. As
a result, numbers on business travelers are obtained coming to a U.S. state s from country
57Hovhannisyan and Keller (2011) use SIAT data on U.S. residents traveling from the United States to
foreign countries.
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c in every quarter from 1993 to 2003.
According to the equation (3), business travelers coming to a certain U.S. state are
weighted by that states patent to GSP ratio, and aggregated over states. Data on patent
stock by U.S. states is calculated based on custom extracts of United States Patents and
Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) les, while data on GSP by year is extracted from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). After performing weighting, we have total number of (weighted)
business travelers coming to the U.S. from foreign countries in every quarter from 1993 to
2003.
The innovation measure used in this paper is domestic patenting by residents of foreign
countries between the years 1993 to 2003. It is obtained from the World Intellectual Property
Organization (Source: WIPO Statistics Database). It measures patent applications by rst-
named resident inventors in the home country. For example, this dataset captures patent
applications led by residents of Japan at the Japan Patent O¢ ce. This is a yearly-level
dataset with varied country coverage.
The size and development level of a country a¤ects its business travel. Therefore, data
on a countrys population and real GDP per capita are used as controls. They are extracted
from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2. It is important to account for other avenues of
international technology transfer such as international trade and FDI, as mentioned above.
Imports from the United States and exports to the United States by each country from 1993
to 2003 is extracted from the U.S. Census Bureau (www.tradedataonline.gov). U.S. FDI in
foreign countries is measured by total sales of majority-owned foreign a¢ liates of U.S. rms
and is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).58
58FDI in the U.S. is only available for a limited set of countries with a lot of missing observations. Therefore,
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The nal sample is an unbalanced quarterly sample for 84 countries for the years 1993-
2003. The list of countries can be found in Appendix Table A2. Summary statistics of the
main variables are presented in Table 1. Patent applications are quite dispersed, with the
variance exceeding the mean. Patents is a count variable, thus Poisson and negative binomial
regressions are appropriate estimation methods. Since there is evidence of over-dispersion,
a negative binomial estimation method is more suitable. Only non-zero business travel to
the U.S. is considered, since this analysis is not applicable to the case of patenting in the
absence of travel. The top countries engaged in business travel to the United States are
Japan, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia. The list of top countries
engaged in business travel to the U.S. is presented in Appendix Table A4.
Some initial evidence on the link between patenting and business travel is presented in
Figures 1 and 2. We can see that there is a positive country-level relationship between
patents-to-GDP ratio and business travel to the United States. In Figure 2, where the major
outliers South Korea and Japan are omitted, an even more signicant positive relationship
is apparent. The empirical strategy will control for country and year xed e¤ects, so general
di¤erences between countries and years will be accounted for in the analysis. Additionally, a
set of controls will be employed to account for factors that vary within a country over time.
The next section presents the empirical results.
3.4 Results
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate a relationship between business travel to
the U.S. and innovation. The results of initial estimation of the equation (2) are presented in
it was not used in the analysis.
68
Table 2. As mentioned above, the estimation method involves negative binomial regressions.
All columns include country and year xed e¤ects. Robust standard errors which allow for
clustering by country-year are shown in parentheses. In the rst column, business travel to
the U.S. is estimated to be positive and signicant, implying that there is a strong positive
association between business travel to the U.S. by a country and that countrys domestic
patenting.
In column 2 of Table 2, controls for population and real GDP per capita are added to
account for the fact that residents of large and rich countries will travel more. As expected,
this decreases the coe¢ cient on business travel from 0.032 to 0.027 while it remains highly
signicant. Next, imports from the U.S. and exports to the U.S. are added as additional
conduits of technology transfer. For example, if a country has a vast trading relationship
with the U.S., there would be a higher need for business travel. Furthermore, Poole (2010)
and Cristea (2011) nd positive relationship between trade and travel; thus, it is important
to control for trade with the U.S. In columns 3 and 4, imports and exports to the U.S.
are negative and not signicantly estimated, however the coe¢ cient on business travel is
virtually unchanged.
U.S. FDI is added to column 5 of Table 2 as an additional control. If the U.S. invested a lot
in a country, this might give rise to both business travel from the a¢ liate to the headquarters
in the U.S., as well as increased domestic patenting. Including U.S. FDI does not change the
estimated coe¢ cient on business travel, while FDI is positive but not signicantly estimated.
Including all controls, the relationship between business travel and patenting is around 0.026
and signicant. Population and real GDP per capita are estimated to be positive and
signicant, while the coe¢ cients on trade and FDI are not signicantly estimated.
69
The results in Table 2 give some initial guidance on the hypothesis of technology sourcing
through international business travel. However, even after controlling for country and year
xed e¤ects and including a set of controls, there are still endogeneity concerns. It is possible
that factors that increase business travel also impact patenting. The best approach is to nd
exogenous variation in business travel to the U.S. that is not correlated with innovation in
these countries. As mentioned above, the exogenous variation to business travel to the United
States that will be used is variation occurring post-September 11, 2001 and subsequent
changes in U.S. visa policy towards Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and non-VWP countries.
As shown in Figure 3, 9/11 impacted VWP and non-VWP countries di¤erently. In general,
travel from VWP countries is larger than from non-VWP countries due to the strength of
economic and political ties with the United States. Additionally, visa restrictions and other
barriers to travel tend to impede travel ow. But VWP countries travel to the U.S. decreased
possibly because of increased security measures and increased global instability. As Figure
3 illustrates, travel from VWP countries to the U.S. decreased more than from non-VWP
countries. This evidence is consistent with ndings by Poole (2010) and Neiman and Swagel
(2009).59
The rst stage regressions of the estimation of equation (4) is shown in Table 3. It
is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In column 1 business travel to the U.S.
is regressed on a dummy of September 11, 2001. The resulting coe¢ cient on September
11 is negative as expected, but not signicant. In column 2, a dummy for Visa Waiver
Program countries in quarter q of year t is added. The coe¢ cient on VWP is positive and
59Neiman and Swagel (2009) explain this decrease as a result of the fact that travelers from countries that
did not require a visa experienced more hassles in general security, and as a result of general fear of ying.
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signicant, while the coe¢ cient on September 11 remains negative. To account for di¤erential
impact of September 11 on travel from countries that required a visa and those that did not,
the interaction of VWP and September 11 is added in column 3. The coe¢ cient on the
interaction is negative and signicant, conrming our earlier conjecture presented in Figure
3. The estimates of column 3 of Table 3 are chosen as the main rst stage specication.
In Table 4 estimates from the second stage estimation are presented. For convenience
the rst column repeats the benchmark specication of Table 2 column 5. In the second
column, domestic patenting is regressed on estimated business travel from the rst stage of
column 3 of Table 3 using negative binomial regression. The estimated coe¢ cient increases
signicantly from 0.026 to 0.3 and is highly signicant. This implies that by taking into
account travel restrictions resulting from global conict and visa requirements that inuence
travel to the United States, the estimates of business travel on innovation are even stronger.
In the third column, the residual from the rst stage is also included, which is positive and
signicant. This should reduce the bias associated with the calculation of clustered country-
year standard errors due to the two-stage procedure. The coe¢ cient on business travel in
columns 2 and 3 is very close, around 0.3. In column 4, Poisson Instrumental Variables
(IV) approach is used, where the instruments are Sept11, Visa Waiver Program and their
interaction as in columns 2 and 3. The results are virtually identical, with an estimated
business travel coe¢ cient of approximately 0.3.
What are the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients? A 10 percent increase in a
countrys business travel to the U.S. increases that countrys domestic patenting by 0.3
percent. Using the two-stage approach the estimates become even stronger: a 10 percent
increase in business travel to the U.S. increases patenting by 3 percent.
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Robustness checks are performed in Table 5. For convenience, the rst column repeats
the benchmark estimates of Table 2 column 5. In the second column, unweighted business
travel to the U.S. is employed. It is smaller in magnitude and not signicantly estimated,
pointing to the importance of weighting business travel. Business travel to a high technology
U.S. state matters more for the subsequent transfer of technological knowledge to the home
country than travel to a low-technology U.S. state. In the third column of Table 3 estimates
from IV Poisson of Table 4 column 4 are included for convenience. To evaluate the sensitivity
of the estimates, patenting in the U.S. is used as an alternative innovation measure in the
right part of table 5. Columns 4, 5, and 6 replicate the specications of the previous columns
with patenting in the U.S. as the dependent variable. Comparing columns 1 and 4, we can
see that estimates of outward business travel on innovation are similar in the case of both
patenting measures. In fact, the estimates in the case of patenting in the U.S. are somewhat
higher, from 0.026 to 0.04. This might have to do with the fact that patenting in the U.S.
is collected quarterly, and that all signicant innovations are patented both domestically
and in the U.S. Unweighted business travel is used in column 5, and the coe¢ cient is much
smaller and not signicantly estimated. When considering IV regressions from travel and
visa restrictions, the estimates of business travel in column 6 and column 3 are essentially the
same, showing that the results of using domestic patenting are robust to another innovation
measure.
The next section presents a concluding discussion.
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3.5 Conclusions
Technological transfer from developed to developing countries is important for the latters
economic growth and convergence. This paper has studied international technology trans-
fer through short-term cross-border labor ows. Travel across borders enables face-to-face
communication, which is particularly important for the transfer of technology since it tends
to be tacit and hard to codify. Business travelers who come to a high-technology country
like the United States can source technological knowledge there, bring it back to their home
country and encourage domestic innovation. Using data on 84 countriesbusiness travel to
the United States between 1993 and 2003, this paper nds that outward business travel is
positively associated with a countrys innovation as measured by domestic patent applica-
tions. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is considerable: a 10 percent increase in outward
business travel increases domestic patenting by 3 percent.
This paper has a number of policy implications. Particularly, this study highlights the
costs of travel restrictions in terms of their impact on innovation. Reducing visa restrictions
and other travel barriers can stimulate international technology transfer and innovation.
Also, this analysis sheds light on the importance of the liberalization of international services.
The substantial gains from the liberalization of air passenger travel after signing Open Skies
Agreements have been discussed by Cristea and Hummels (2011). This study stresses the
liberalization of travel in terms of innovation, which might have more long-term economic
growth implications for countries.
The empirical analysis performed in this paper presents the rst evidence on the impor-
tance of outward business travel for a countrys innovation. Future research can extend this
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analysis by including other samples and countries. Also, data on international travel is not
very systematic across countries and does not always distinguish the purpose of each trip.
Thus, there is a need for higher-quality data on international travel.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Domestic Patents 2231 11179.230 49871.310 0 384201
Business Travel to US 2231 3.299 1.542 0.053 8.114
Population 2231 9.881 1.556 5.609 14.068
Real GDP per capita 2231 9.251 0.827 6.556 10.843
Imports from US 2231 21.791 1.511 16.432 24.937
Exports to US 2231 22.013 1.610 15.392 25.750
US FDI 2231 22.726 1.989 13.816 26.734
The sample includes 84 countries, and 11 years (1993-2003). All variables besides
domestic patents are in natural logarithms. US FDI is total sales of majority owned US
affiliates.
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Figure 1: Business Travel and Patenting
Figure 2: Business Travel and Patenting (omitting South Korea and Japan)
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Table 2: Benchmark Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Domestic Patenting
Business Travel to US 0.032** 0.027** 0.027** 0.026** 0.026**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Population 2.792*** 2.803*** 2.820*** 2.669***
(0.569) (0.566) (0.557) (0.576)
Real GDP per capita 0.587** 0.650*** 0.758*** 0.624**
(0.245) (0.247) (0.270) (0.281)
Imports from US -0.055 -0.040 -0.054
(0.075) (0.076) (0.074)
Exports to US -0.094 -0.103
(0.085) (0.084)
US FDI 0.070
(0.049)
Observations 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231
Log-likelihood -14525 -14457 -14455 -14452 -14449
Notes: All specifications include country and year fixed effects.  Robust standard
errors which allow for clustering by country-year are reported in parenthesis. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 3: Business Travel- VWP and non-VWP Countries
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Table 3: First Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Business Travel to US
September 11 -0.057 -0.061 0.023
(0.081) (0.080) (0.087)
Visa Waiver Program 0.496*** 0.562***
(0.088) (0.091)
Visa Waiver Program * Sept 11 -0.207***
(0.070)
Population 0.903 0.648 0.191
(0.626) (0.619) (0.641)
Real GDP per capita 0.502 0.398 0.409
(0.315) (0.313) (0.312)
Imports from US 0.056 0.051 0.038
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Exports to US -0.209** -0.214** -0.224***
(0.087) (0.086) (0.086)
US FDI 0.014 0.028 0.010
(0.067) (0.066) (0.067)
Observations 2231 2231 2231
R-squared 0.833 0.835 0.836
Notes:  All specifications include country and year fixed effects.  Robust
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 4: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions
Negative
Binomial
2-stage
Negative
Binomial
2-stage
Negative
Binomial
IV Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Domestic Patenting
Business Travel to US 0.026**
(0.013)
Estimated Business Travel to US 0.300*** 0.301*** 0.303***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.074)
Residual from the First-stage 0.021*
(0.013)
Population 2.669*** 2.395*** 2.386*** 2.265***
(0.576) (0.584) (0.584) (0.436)
Real GDP per capita 0.624** 0.479* 0.475* 0.531***
(0.281) (0.281) (0.282) (0.200)
Imports from US -0.054 -0.069 -0.068 -0.084
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.053)
Exports to US -0.103 -0.049 -0.049 -0.049
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.064)
US FDI 0.070 0.065 0.065 0.070*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.037)
Observations 2231 2231 2231 2231
Log-likelihood -14449 -14443 -14440 -14440
Notes:  All specifications include country and year fixed effects.  Robust standard errors
which allow for clustering by country-year are reported in parenthesis in columns (1),
(2) and (3). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Appendix (for Chapter 1)
Appendix 1: Countries in the Sample
Argentina Italy
Australia Japan
Austria Korea: Republic of
Belgium Malaysia
Brazil Mexico
Chile Netherlands
China New Zealand
Colombia Norway
Costa Rica Peru
Czech Republic Philippines
Denmark Poland
Ecuador Portugal
Egypt Russia
Finland Saudi Arabia
France Singapore
Germany South Africa
Greece Spain
Honduras Sweden
Hong Kong Switzerland
Hungary Taiwan
India Turkey
Indonesia United Kingdom
Ireland Venezuela
Israel
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B Appendix (for Chapter 2)
B.1 Appendix Tables
Table A1: NBER Technological Subcategories
Subcategory Description Subcategory Description
11
Chemical: Agriculture, Food
&Textiles
45
Electrical & Electronics: Power
Systems
12 Chemical: Coating 46
Electrical & Electronics:
Semiconductor Devices
13 Chemical: Gas 49 Electrical & Electronics: Miscellaneous
14 Chemical: Organic Compounds 51 Mechanical: Mat. Proc & Handling
15 Chemical: Resins 52 Mechanical: Metal Working
19 Chemical: Miscellaneous 53 Mechanical: Motors & Engines, Parts
21
Computers & Communications:
Communications
54 Mechanical: Optics
22
Computers & Communications :
Computer Hardware & Software
55 Mechanical: Transportation
23
Computers & Communications :
Computer Peripherals
59 Mechanical: Miscellaneous
24
Computers & Communications:
Information Storage
61 Others: Agriculture, Husbandry &Food
25
Computers & Communications :
Electronic business methods and
software
62 Others: Amusement Devices
31 Drugs & Medicine: Drugs 63 Others: Apparel & Textile
32
Drugs & Medicine: Surgery &
Med Inst.
64 Others: Earth Working & Wells
33 Drugs & Medicine: Genetics 65 Others: Furniture & House Fixtures
39
Drugs & Medicine:
Miscellaneous
66 Others: Heating
41
Electrical & Electronics:
Electrical Devices
67 Others: Pipes & Joints
42
Electrical & Electronics:
Electrical Lighting
68 Others: Receptacles
43
Electrical & Electronics:
Measuring & Testing
69 Others: Miscellaneous
44
Electrical & Electronics: Nuclear
& X-rays
Notes: This classification is based on NBER patent data project classification (classification 2006 excel
file).  Source: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads/patn-data-description
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Table A2A: US Patenting by States, 1993-2003
State Sum of patents by
state, 1993-2003
State Sum of patents by
state, 1993-2003
Alabama 4277 N. Carolina 20142
Alaska 521 Nebraska 2290
Arizona 17271 Nevada 3692
Arkansas 1829 New Hampshire 6846
California 202830 New Jersey 41686
Colorado 21337 New Mexico 3833
Connecticut 20141 New York 68699
Delaware 4668 North Dakota 801
Florida 28949 Ohio 35574
Georgia 15294 Oklahoma 5893
Hawaii 905 Oregon 16015
Idaho 14952 Pennsylvania 37766
Illinois 40205 Puerto Rico 258
Indiana 15905 Rhode Island 3251
Iowa 7054 S. Carolina 6257
Kansas 4489 S. Dakota 801
Kentucky 4794 Tennessee 8860
Louisiana 5083 Texas 67284
Maine 1585 Utah 7876
Maryland 16128 Vermont 4209
Massachusetts 40813 Virginia 12678
Michigan 41655 W. Virginia 1608
Minnesota 30280 Washington 24422
Mississippi 1821 Washington, DC 733
Missouri 9600 Wisconsin 19188
Montana 1474 Wyoming 614
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Table A2B:  US Patenting by Industries, 1993-2003
Subcategory Description
Sum of patents by
industries, 1993-2003
11 Chemical: Agriculture, Food &Textiles 2404
12 Chemical: Coating 11814
13 Chemical: Gas 3597
14 Chemical: Organic Compounds 15801
15 Chemical: Resins 22499
19 Chemical: Miscellaneous 68308
21 Computers & Communications: Communications 80433
22 Computers & Communications : Computer Hardware
& Software 74403
23 Computers & Communications : Computer Peripherals 22983
24 Computers & Communications: Information Storage 34557
25 Computers & Communications : Electronic business
methods and software 16475
31 Drugs & Medicine: Drugs 67206
32 Drugs & Medicine: Surgery & Med Inst. 48587
33 Drugs & Medicine: Genetics 3927
39 Drugs & Medicine: Miscellaneous 9298
41 Electrical & Electronics: Electrical Devices 26673
42 Electrical & Electronics: Electrical Lighting 13495
43 Electrical & Electronics: Measuring & Testing 25291
44 Electrical & Electronics: Nuclear & X-rays 11057
45 Electrical & Electronics: Power Systems 29589
46 Electrical & Electronics: Semiconductor Devices 40253
49 Electrical & Electronics: Miscellaneous 18266
51 Mechanical: Mat. Proc & Handling 30835
52 Mechanical: Metal Working 16823
53 Mechanical: Motors & Engines, Parts 19412
54 Mechanical: Optics 11005
55 Mechanical: Transportation 24565
59 Mechanical: Miscellaneous 34426
61 Others: Agriculture, Husbandry &Food 16882
62 Others: Amusement Devices 12920
63 Others: Apparel & Textile 10156
64 Others: Earth Working & Wells 11417
65 Others: Furniture & House Fixtures 19629
66 Others: Heating 6220
67 Others: Pipes & Joints 5620
68 Others: Receptacles 15996
69 Others: Miscellaneous 72355
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Table A3A: Countries in the Sample
Argentina Luxembourg
Australia Mexico
Austria Netherlands
Belgium New Zealand
China Norway
Czech Republic Poland
Denmark Portugal
Finland Romania
France Russia
Germany Singapore
Greece Slovakia
Hungary Slovenia
Iceland South Africa
Ireland Spain
Israel Sweden
Italy Switzerland
Japan Turkey
Korea, South United Kingdom
Table A3B: Countries in the Sample
OECD Countries Non-OECD countries
Australia Korea, South Argentina
Austria Luxembourg China
Belgium Mexico Israel
Czech Republic Netherlands Romania
Denmark New Zealand Russia
Finland Norway Singapore
France Poland Slovenia
Germany Portugal South Africa
Greece Slovakia
Hungary Spain
Iceland Sweden
Ireland Switzerland
Italy Turkey
Japan United Kingdom
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B.2 Data Appendix
This section gives the details on the sources and construction of our main variables.
Innovation U.S. patent counts: The data on U.S. patents issued from 1993-2003
comes from the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO), Custom Data Ex-
tracts. The individual inventor database, which has address information (street, city, state,
country of residence, etc) for each of multiple inventors per patent, is combined with the
bibliographical patent database, which has application month and year, as well as original
USPTO technological category for each patent. If a patent has multiple inventors, we assign
a fraction of 1=n to each inventors country of residence, where n is the number of inventors.
Using the original USPTO technological categories, each patent is assigned to one of 37 sub-
categories based on NBER patent classication (Hall et al. 2001). Then using application
month and year for each patent, patents are aggregated by foreign country and technological
subcategory for each quarter during the period 1993-2003 to obtain patent counts by foreign
countries and industries for each quarter for years 1993-2003.
Joint U.S. patent counts: To identify patents which have a combination of foreign and
U.S. coinventors we also calculated foreign patent counts of only patents for which there is
at least one U.S. coinventor. Using the same methodology as above, foreign patents with at
least one U.S. coinventor are obtained by aggregating by foreign country and industry for
each quarter during the period 1993-2003.
U.S. patent stock by states and by industries: For the sample period 1993-2003, each
patent with multiple inventors is assigned a fraction of 1=n, where n is the number of
inventors. Then keeping only U.S. inventors, patent counts are aggregated to a given state
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for each quarter during the years 1993-2003. Similarly, patent counts are aggregated to a
given industry for each quarter during the years 1993-2003.
Travel The data on international air travel comes from the Survey of International Air
Travelers (SIAT), which is conducted by the United States O¢ ce of Travel and Tourism In-
dustries, a branch of the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
SIAT collects data on non-U.S. residents traveling to the U.S. and U.S. residents traveling
from the U.S (excluding Canada). This survey has been carried out monthly starting from
1983 on randomly selected ights from the major U.S. international gateway airports for over
70 participating domestic and foreign airlines. Questionnaires in 12 languages are distributed
onboard U.S. outbound ight to international destinations.
In this paper we use data on U.S. residents traveling from the United States to foreign
countries in the period of 1993-2003. Outbound U.S. resident travel data is an individual
level database which has information on travelersU.S. county of residence, country of citi-
zenship, main purpose of the trip, secondary purposes of the trip, main destination foreign
cities, secondary destination foreign cities, occupation, quarter and year of travel. Trips can
be made for the purpose of business, visiting friends and relatives, and religious, among oth-
ers. Possible occupations include homemaker and retired, among others. Main destination
and secondary destination cities are both coded. Individual observations are expanded if a
particular individual traveled to distinct destination countries, treating each destination as a
separate trip. If a particular traveler mentioned multiple purposes of the trip, each purpose
is given equal weight. Further, expanded individual travel observations are aggregated by
purpose of the trip and occupations by U.S. state and foreign country for each quarter during
the years 1993-2003.
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Our main variable of interest is Bscqt; the number of business travelers from state s to
foreign country c in quarter q of year t. We calculated the number of travelers who are
visitors, are traveling for religious reasons, or are retired or homemakers in the same way.
These aggregated travel variables are weighted by the ratio of U.S. state patent stock to
real state GDP and a given industrys strength in the U.S. (source: U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA), see equation (2). The nal travel variables
are in natural logarithms, with one added to each value. The impact of adding one is small,
as the results for the sample with strictly positive numbers of travelers are very similar.
Other variables Population size, real GDP per capita for each year 1993-2003 and
country are obtained from Penn World Tables, version 6.2. U.S. exports by country and
year 1993-2003 are collected from U.S. Census Bureau (www.usatradeonline.gov). U.S. FDI
by destination countries and year 1993-2003 is proxied by the total sales of U.S. majority-
owned multinational a¢ liates and comes from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Gross domestic expenditures on R&D expenditures (GERD) for each country in year 1993-
2003 are obtained from OECD Statistics, which has data on OECD countries as well as
some non-OECD member economies. Each countrys total patent applications (by rst
named inventor) both by residents as well as non-residents of that country in 1993-2003 are
from World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). All control variables employed in
the analysis are in natural logarithms, with the exception of patent applications by residents
and non-residents which are in natural logarithms but with one added to each value. The
nal sample is an unbalanced quarterly sample for 36 countries and 37 industries for the
years 1993-2003.
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C Appendix (for Chapter 3)
Table A1: Visa Waiver Program Countries during 1993-2003
Country
Date of
admittance
Date of
cancelation
1 Andorra
2 Argentina Jul-96 Feb-02
3 Australia Jul-96
4 Austria
5 Belgium
6 Brunei
7 Denmark
8 Finland
9 France
10 Germany
11 Iceland
12 Ireland Apr-95
13 Italy
14 Japan
15 Liechtenstein
16 Luxembourg
17 Monaco
18 Netherlands
19 New Zealand
20 Norway
21 Portugal Aug-99
22 San Marino
23 Singapore Aug-99
24 Slovenia Sep-97
25 Spain
26 Sweden
27 Switzerland
28 United Kingdom
29 Uruguay Aug-99 Apr-03
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics, 1993-2003. For Slovenia, actual
entries began in 1998.  Visa Waiver Pilot Program started in
1986. Unless mentioned otherwise, the countries were
members of VWP since it began.
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Table A2: Countries in the Sample
Algeria Latvia
Argentina Lithuania
Australia Luxembourg
Austria Macedonia
Bangladesh Malawi
Belarus Malaysia
Belgium Malta
Brazil Moldova
Bulgaria Morocco
Chile Netherlands
China New Zealand
Colombia Nicaragua
Costa Rica Norway
Croatia Pakistan
Czech Republic Panama
Denmark Paraguay
Ecuador Peru
Egypt Philippines
Estonia Poland
Ethiopia Portugal
Finland Romania
France Russia
Georgia Saudi Arabia
Germany Singapore
Greece Slovakia
Guatemala Slovenia
Haiti South Africa
Honduras Spain
Hong Kong Sri Lanka
Hungary Sweden
Iceland Switzerland
India Thailand
Indonesia Trinidad & Tobago
Ireland Tunisia
Israel Turkey
Italy Ukraine
Jamaica United Kingdom
Japan Uruguay
Kazakhstan Venezuela
Kenya Vietnam
Korea, South Yemen
Kyrgyzstan Zambia
101
Table A3: Countries in the Sample,
Members of the Visa Waiver
Program
Argentina Luxembourg
Australia Netherlands
Austria New Zealand
Belgium Norway
Denmark Portugal
Finland Singapore
France Slovenia
Germany Spain
Iceland Sweden
Ireland Switzerland
Italy United Kingdom
Japan Uruguay
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Table A4: Top Countries with Business Travel to
U.S.
Country
Sum of business travel,
1993-2003
Japan 54696
Taiwan 16228
Germany 15656
United Kingdom 15044
Australia 14162
Singapore 7800
Brazil 7218
South Africa 6758
France 6472
Italy 6067
New Zealand 4986
Netherlands 4634
Switzerland 4463
Malaysia 4455
China 3960
India 3807
Sweden 3067
Argentina 2641
Korea, South 2528
Poland 2236
Hong Kong 2194
Philippines 2154
Belgium 2044
Indonesia 2033
Spain 1960
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